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CRIME, WAR & ROMANTICISM: 
ARTHUR ANDERSEN AND THE NATURE OF ENTITY GUILT 
David N. Cassuto * 
"Our law has not gone so far in accepting that any antisocial 
attitude is sufficient to justify criminal punishment."' 
"Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, 
when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be 
k i~ked?"~  
In 2002, Arthur Andersen, LLP stood trial for obstruction of 
justice. The prosecution offered several theories as to who at 
the firm had committed the crime but no one theory satisfied 
all twelve jurors. In an attempt to break its deadlock, the 
jury asked whether it could convict i f  some jurors thought 
Person A at Andersen had done it and some thought it was 
Person B. Following argument, the judge ruled that it could 
convict. 
This article argues that the court's response to the jury's 
query was wrong as a matter of law and policy. The ruling 
misconstrues the nature of corporate criminal intent and 
effectively treats a domestic corporate entity as if it were a 
rogue nation facing trial for war crimes. Part I offers a brief 
history of Andersen's rise and fall. Part 11 examines 
Andersen 's association with Enron and the events that led to 
Andersen 's indictment and trial. Part 111 analyzes the court's 
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Wesleyan University, J.D., University of California - Berkeley, Boalt Hall 
School of Law, PhD, Indiana University. Thanks go to Bridget Crawford, Don 
Doernberg & Ben Gershman for their insights and comments. Jessica Astrof, 
Bill McNamara and Brenna Zortman provided stellar and invaluable research 
assistance, as did Emily Collins. My beloved, Elizabeth Downes, made this 
article both possible and better. If this is any good, it is because she is so 
wonderful. Finally, my son and most appreciative reader, Jesse Yates Cassuto, 
makes it all worth doing. 
1 Sanford Kadish & Stephen Schulhofer, Case of Lady Eldon's French Lace 
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ruling on the jury's question and situates it within the nature 
of entity guilt. Part IV contextualizes the dispute over 
collective responsibility within a larger cultural context, 
including the "War on Crime." The Conclusion and 
Postscript offer some thoughts on the dangers - both present 
and future - of our national obsession with war. 
INTRODUCTION 
The War on Crime has wrought considerable collateral damage. 
Arthur Andersen, LLP ("Andersen"), former accounting giant and 
scandal-rocked auditor of scandal-rocked corporations, hardly qualifies 
as an innocent victim. A storied member of the "Big ~ i v e , " ~  Andersen 
was Enron7s auditor, providing both auditing, and consulting services to 
the giant, Texas-based energy company. When Enron collapsed amidst 
massive accounting fraud, Andersen faced investigation and public 
excoriation. When it was later revealed that a group of people at 
Andersen had engaged in a massive shredding operation, and that 
millions of Enron-related documents had been destroyed, the firm faced 
criminal charges. This hardly seems like a resume for victimhood. 
Yet, the firm's 2002 trial for criminal obstruction of justice was 
marred by serious procedural errors. The jury instructions contained 
several crucial flaws, only one of which was addressed on appeal.4 It is 
another major procedural error that forms the focus of this article. 
Though it did not ultimately affect the verdict, the error nevertheless has 
The "Big Eight," global accounting firms had compressed to five following a string of 
mergers. When Andersen imploded, the remaining firms became known as "The Final 
Four." See John P. Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the 
International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 2 1 1 , 2  14 (2003). 
4 While Andersen's conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court in May, 2005, the 
reversible error differs from the issue treated herein. Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United 
States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005). According to the instructions, jurors did not have to 
believe that the guilty agent consciously knew that her corrupt persuasion amounted to 
an act of wrongdoing. The Court held that this instruction fundamentally misinterpreted 
the statute. In my view, the Court correctly found that the jury was improperly 
instructed as to how to interpret the phrase "knowingly " in conjunction with "corruptly 
persuade" in 18 U.S.C.A. 1512 (2005). Andersen, 125 S. Ct. at 2135-36. However, this 
article focuses on the related but discrete issue of whether the jury was properly 
instructed that it did not need to unanimously agree on the identity of the guilty corporate 
agent. As a practical matter, the Court's decision amounted to little more than a pyrrhic 
victory for the company, which had long since ceased to operate in any significant 
capacity. 
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far-reaching implications for future criminal prosecutions of 
corporations. 
The error arose in response to the jury's query as to whether it had to 
unanimously agree upon the identity of the Andersen agent who 
obstructed justice. The court ruled that it did not. That ruling 
effectively negated the requirement for jury unanimity that is the right of 
every federal criminal defendant.' It further revealed a fundamental 
misapprehension by both the judge and the prosecution regarding the 
nature of corporate criminal intent. As a result, Andersen found itself 
facing the possibility of a criminal conviction without a unanimous 
verdict. Though this prospect was averted by the jury's eventual 
consensus, the ruling created a disturbing precedent for future corporate 
prosecutions and for due process in general. 
This article argues that the court's response to the jury's question 
was wrong as a matter of law and policy. It consists of four parts. Part I 
offers a brief history of Andersen. Part I1 examines the circumstances 
leading up to the trial and the events of the trial itself. Part I11 focuses 
on Jury Note # 9, which requested the court's guidance on unanimity. 
Part IV contextualizes the dispute over they jury's query within a larger 
discussion of collective responsibility and its role in the "War on 
Crime." The Conclusion and Postscript offer some thoughts on the 
dangers-both present and future--of our national obsession with war. 
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 (stating that a jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict 
unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved each element of the crime); 
see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 369 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe 
Justices of this Court have recognized, virtually without dissent, that unanimity is one of 
the indispensable features of federal jury trial."); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 
748 (1948) ("Unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments apply"). 
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The willingness of the prosecution and the court to treat Andersen, 
the incorporeal legal entity,6 as an entified, malevolent actor and its 
agents like automata made strategic sense at the time. It also fits within 
the rhetoric of war, which tends to entify nations and attribute to them a 
malevolence that can only truly be found within the minds of 
individuals. This bellicose rhetoric depicts the opponent as not just a 
defendant but an enemy threatening the motherland. And, when dealing 
with enemies of state, the niceties of due process often dwindle in 
importance. 
Personifying ideas and/or corporate entities in this manner resembles 
the phenomenon of Associated Will-Rousseau's characterization of 
the process by which a single entity is abstracted from a group of 
individuals, usually citizens of a n a t i ~ n . ~  One most often encounters 
Associated Will in times of war and, indeed, much of international 
criminal law is based on the notion of national identity and collective 
guilt.8 As discussed below, Associated Will plays an important role in 
wars between nations and international adjudications but has (or should 
have) little applicability to internal conflicts. Incorporating it into 
domestic criminal prosecutions undermines the rights and safeguards 
that protect society against excesses of state vigilance. 
Though Andersen was organized as a limited partnership rather than a corporation, 
prosecutors treated it, for all intents and purposes, as a corporation. This approach is 
congruent with the United States Code, 1 U.S.C. 5 1 (2000), the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, U.S. SENTENCING UIDELINES MANUAL 5 8Al.l n.1 (1991), and legal 
precedent; see United States v. AP Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 123 (1958). See also 
Sterling P.A. Darling, Jr., Note, Mitigating the Impressionability of the Incorporeal 
Mind: Reassessing Unanimity Following the Obstruction of Justice Case of United 
States v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1625, 1642-3 & n.109 (2003) 
(noting same). Indeed, Andersen, the legal entity, fits within the broader definition of a 
corporation as "[A] group or succession of persons established in accordance with legal 
rules into a legal or juristic person that has legal personality distinct from the natural 
persons who make it up. . . ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 365 (8th ed. 2004). 
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OMANTICS AT WAR 36-37 (2002); George P. Fletcher, The 
Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 11 1 
YALE L.J. 1499, 1509 (2002). This article owes a tremendous intellectual debt to 
Professor Fletcher. My attempt in Part IV to describe the theory of collective guilt that 
emerged from the Andersen trial as the product of a rhetorical strategy derived from a 
neo-Romantic worldview draws heavily on Fletcher's elegant contrast between the 
Romantic and Liberal visions of selfhood and their respective relationships to the notion 
of collective guilt. 
See MARCELLUS DONALD A.R. VON REDLICH, THE LAW OF NATIONS 14 (1 937) (The law 
of nations, is concerned only with States, and not with the individual citizens or subjects 
thereof and these States are considered to have "rights" and "duties."). 
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANDERSEN 
Arthur Andersen founded the firm with partner Clarence DeLany in 
1913. DeLany left in 191 8 and was replaced by Andersen's brother, 
Walter, who departed in 1932. During the firm's early years, Arthur 
Andersen, the individual, emerged as a powerful voice for probity and 
candor in public accounting. The firm's burgeoning reputation as a 
company that placed duty to the public above all else derived primarily 
from the personality and pronouncements of its founder. 
Stories about Arthur Andersen's uncompromising honesty became 
legend, told and retold for decades following his death in 1947. One oft- 
repeated story related how a client had demanded that Andersen alter its 
audit certification to cover up the client's distortion of his company's 
earnings. Andersen refused, replying: "There is not enough money in 
the city of Chicago to induce me to change the report."9 Other stories 
abounded, each testifying to Andersen's rigid allegiance to the highest 
business ethics. As the firm emerged as the gold standard for integrity 
among public auditing companies, its fame (and that of its founder) 
eclipsed even that of Jake "Greasy Thumb" Guzik, Chicago's other 
famous accountant, whose notoriety derived primarily from his principal 
client, A1 capone.'' 
One of Arthur Andersen's signature innovations was to indoctrinate 
people into the firm early in their careers. The goal was to turn them 
into "Androids"-as they later became known-for life. The fm 
recruited people right out of college and trained them at an Andersen 
training facility, schooling them in how to live as well as initiating them 
into the accounting profession. It instructed them on what to wear, 
where to eat, how to behave, and most importantly, how to conduct 
public audits in the Andersen way." 
Arthur Andersen quoted in SUSAN E. SQUIRES, ET AL., INSIDE ARTHUR ANDERSEN: 
SHIFTING VALUES, UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES 32 (2003). 
10 See BARBARA LEY TOFFLER, FINAL ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED AND THE FALL OF 
ARTHUR ANDERSEN 14- 15 (Broadway Books 2003). Andersen's reputation also received 
a major boost when he and his firm were hired to audit the books of the legendary 
utilities magnate, Samuel Insull. See DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM 88
(2005). Insull, who had started out as Thomas Edison's amanuensis, rose to become one 
of the most powerful businessmen in the country. Id. at 81. As it turned out, much of the 
fuel for his rapid rise lay in sketchy business practices that led to his downfall. Id. at 88. 
Andersen's brilliant and forthright job of auditing Insull's companies in the aftermath of 
their collapse solidified his and the firm's reputation for integrity. Id. 
1 I See TOFFLER, supra note 8, at 25-33. 
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The idea was that companies would hire Arthur Andersen, LLP, not 
individuals at the firm. It did not matter who actually conducted the 
audit; every member of the firm performed audits in the same way. The 
quality of service, like the color of employees' shirts, was uniform 
throughout the world. In addition, when Androids left the firm, they 
retained a powerful institutional loyalty that created new relationships 
throughout the business world.'* 
For most of the firm's existence, Arthur Andersen, LLP stood 
proudly atop the auditing world as a paragon of business ethics and rigid 
adherence to law. The firm was also famous for its strong hierarchy and 
insular culture that demanded conformity to secure advancement. Over 
time, however, the firm devolved into a profit-driven, unscrupulous 
enterprise that privileged client satisfaction and revenue generation over 
safeguarding the public trust. 
1. Business Consulting Comes Into Its Own 
As Andersen grew into a worldwide partnership and the largest of 
the public accounting firms, the Android tradition began showing signs 
l 2  For example, "[flrom 1989-2001, eighty-six people left Andersen to work for Enron. 
Andersen alumni at Enron included . . . its chief accounting officer; . . . Enron's 
treasurer; and Sherron Smith Watkins, the vice president who unsuccessfully tried to 
blow the whistle on Enron's aggressive accounting." Matthew J. Barrett, Enron and 
Andersen-What Went Wrong and Why Similar Audit Failures Could Happen Again, in 
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 155, 160 (Nancy B. Rapoport & 
Bala G. Dharan eds. Foundation Press 2004) (footnote omitted). This was typical of 
Andersen's relationships with its clients. The continual exchange of personnel between 
audit firms and their clients has been partially addressed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
which bars audit firms from performing audit services for any public company whose 
"chief executive officer, controller, chief financial officer, chief accounting officer, or 
any person serving in an equivalent position for the issuer, was employed by that 
registered independent public accounting firm and participated in any capacity in the 
audit of that issuer during the 1-year period preceding the date of the initiation of the 
audit." 15 U.S.C. 5 78j-l(1) (2002). 
However, while the Act also requires that the lead auditor on audit engagements rotate 
every five years (15 U.S.C. 78Cj-I)), it does not (and arguably cannot) address the 
unconscious bias that auditors likely feel for companies staffed by their alumni. See 
SKEEL, supra note 8, at 188 (citing study showing that when a company chooses an 
auditor, the auditor's judgment is distorted if she considers the company to be her client; 
auditors were 30% more likely to find that a company's accounting conformed with 
GAAP if they believed that the company rather than a third party had hired them to do 
the audit). 
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of strain. A schism emerged in the 1950s between the firm's consulting 
group, which helped companies organize their financial and accounting 
systems, and the firm's auditors, who determined whether a company's 
accounting systems were accurate and trustworthy. The resulting 
tension was both financial and philosophical. 
Simply juxtaposing the two groups' respective missions highlights 
their inevitable conflict. For an audit firm pledged to impartially 
evaluate the finances of public companies to help those same companies 
design their financial management systems makes the firm both author 
and evaluator of its clients' accounting systems. All of the major 
accounting f m s  wrestled with this embedded conflict and it became a 
potent source of contention with the SEC. By openly and vociferously 
opposing the efforts of the SEC to rein in consulting services offered by 
audit  firm^,'^ Andersen and its sister firms successfully blocked 
meaningful reform of the auditorlclient relationship until the passage of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.'~ 
In the view of the Andersen partnership, the chief conflict between 
audits and consulting lay in the parceling of profits. By the 1970s, the 
consulting wing of the firm was generating more profits per partner than 
the audit branch.'* Much haggling ensued as the firm acclimated to a 
new era where audits no longer formed the firm's profit center.16 
Adapting to this new reality required a seismic shift in the firm's self- 
image and culture. Ultimately, that shift proved too much and, in 1997, 
Andersen Consulting (later, "Accenture") separated from Andersen in an 
l 3  See SQUIRES, ET. AL, supra note 7, at 1 15-18; TOFFLER, supra note 8 .  
l4 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 1 1 ,  15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)). Among other 
reforms, the Act bars accounting firms from performing consulting and audit work for 
the same client. The effectiveness of the Act has yet to be h l ly  assessed, although many 
commentators feel that it did not do enough to change the systemic problems within the 
public accounting sphere. For detailed analysis of the both the law and its implications, 
see Lucci, supra note 1 .  
l 5  See TOFFLER, supra note 8, at 73. 
l 6  This shift in revenue generation was not solely an Andersen phenomenon; it was 
occurring industry-wide. SKEEL, supra note 8, at 166. 
In 1976, more than 70% of the major accounting firms' revenue came 
from profits. By 1998, this number had plummeted to 38%. 
Accounting firms that had achieved prominence by developing an 
international reputation for their audits . . . started to look like 
consulting companies that did a little auditing on the side. 
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acrimonious split that catapulted the firm from the largest in the Big 5 to 
the smallest and least profitable.'7 
As Andersen scrambled to recreate its in-house business consulting 
arm, revenue issues became more and more urgent. Cross-selling 
services and maximizing billables became a mandatory part of every 
partner's client relations.I8 Partners were rewarded with points, which 
translated into money, regardless of the risky nature of the client services 
they sold.I9 
Disaster did not tarry long in coming. By the late 1990s, the 
headlines regularly featured Andersen clients engulfed in major fraud 
investigations. 
2. Andersen Clients Embroiled in Accounting Fraud 
During the period surrounding the turn of the millennium, 
Andersen's clients seemed to follow one another into high-profile 
collapse. Some examples include: 
Baptist Foundation of America 
Baptist Foundation of America ("BFA"), a non-profit charitable 
organization and Andersen client, imploded in 1999. Thousands of 
elderly investors lost millions of dollars in savings. Despite multiple 
warnings that the organization was operating an enormous Ponzi 
scheme, Andersen had continued to endorse BFA's accounting.20 In 
1996, one of BFA's accountants even wrote the CEO that he "[did] not 
believe that our Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ, would have us conduct 
His business in a manner that withholds important information from our 
 investor^."^' Approximately 13,000 elderly investors lost $590 million 
in retirement savings. For its failure to properly manage the company's 
I' See John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud & Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's 
Perspective, 76 U .  COLO. L. REV. 57,89-90 (2005) ("By 1999, Andersen had the smallest 
auditing business of the Big Five accounting firms, with the slowest rate of growth."). 
I8  See generally TOFFLER, supra note 8, at 123-24. 
l9 ~ e e , i d .  at 11 1-12. 
*' The same Andersen partner responsible for BFA had also supervised audits of one of 
Charles Keating's failed savings and loans in the late 1980s, an engagement for which 
Andersen paid a $24 million dollar settlement. See TOFFLER, supra note 8, at 153. 
'' See id. at 152-53. 
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audits, Andersen paid a civil penalty and $2 17 million to settle lawsuits 
brought by defrauded investors.22 
Sunbeam Corporation 
"Chainsaw Al" Dunlap took over Sunbeam Corporation 
("Sunbeam") in 1996 ostensibly to restructure the business and restore it 
to profitability. According to the SEC, Dunlap created an illusion of 
success through fraudulent accounting.23 Sunbeam restated its earnings 
for 1997 and 1998 and reduced its earnings from $109.4 million to $38.3 
million. Sunbeam's stockholders filed suit against several company 
officials as well as an Andersen partner who had managed the account. 
According to Deloitte & Touche, which did the forensic accounting 
following the restatements, Dunlap overstated Sunbeam's losses in 1996 
and then overstated the company's gains in 1997-98. The SEC opined 
that Andersen should never have signed off on Sunbeam's flawed 
financial statements-statements which in its view amounted to fraud.24 
Andersen maintained that it had acted appropriately. The firm settled 
civil claims with Sunbeam shareholders by agreeing to a $1 10 million 
dollar settlement." 
Waste Mana~ement, Inc. 
Waste Management, Inc. ("WMI"), a rollup collection of garbage 
disposal companies was a blue chip corporate success story during the 
1970s and 1980s. Andersen had served as the company's auditor since 
before it went public in 1971 .26 Over time, WMI overextended itself and 
began inflating the value of its assets and undervaluing expenses. 
Andersen auditors suggested but did not insist that the company correct 
its accounting errors. WMI declined. 
A subsequent SEC investigation in 1997-98 led WMI to restate $1.5 
billion in revenues. At the time it was "the largest earnings restatement 
22 See SQUIRES, ET. AL, supra note 7, at 1 18. 
23 See Jennifer G .  Hill, Deconstructing Sunbeam-Contemporaly Issues in Corporate 
Governance, 67 U .  CIN.L.REV. 1099, 1124-25 (1999). 
24 See Cease-and-Desist Order, Accounting & Audit Enforcement Act Release No. 1393, 
2001 WL 616627 (May 15, 2001); see also Ira L. Konel et al., The Interplay Between 
Intellectual Property (IP) and Sarbanes-Oxley, 824 PRACTISING LAW INST. 477, 619 
(Mar. - May, 2005). 
25 See SQUIRES ET AL., supra note 7, at 119-20. 
26 See TOFFLER, supra note 8, at 145. 
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in history."27 WMI's restatement badly tarnished Andersen's reputation. 
The firm's public image was further sullied when Andersen's records 
revealed that members of the firm knew of WMI's accounting problems 
even as Andersen was endorsing WMI's fraudulent financial 
 statement^.^' 
In June of 2001, Andersen entered into a consent decree against the 
firm and three of its partners. It admitted no wrongdoing but was 
"enjoined from further violations of the securities laws and fined $7 
million."29 An injunction of this nature might have provided a sobering 
reality check for Andersen and engendered an overdue review of its 
policies. Sadly, it did not. 
Instead, Andersen's response to the WMI debacle was to draft a 
document retention policy that later played an important role in the 
Enron debacle. The policy aimed to ensure that potentially 
incriminating documents were not preserved unnecessarily.30 One of the 
policy's authors was a former member of the WMI engagement team.31 
The parade of headline grabbing corporate scandals involving 
Andersen clients did not end with WMI. In addition to Enron, Global 
Crossing, Qwest Communications, and WorldCom all collapsed, as did 
numerous other companies.32 This litany makes clear that the propensity 
to overlook major accounting irregularities at Enron was far from an 
isolated anomaly. It formed part of a larger problem of business ethics 
that infused the entire firm, slowly eroding its reputation and ability to 
27 Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Misread Depths of the Government's Anger, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 18, 2002, at Al .  
28 See Bany Tarlow, RICO Report, CHAMPION 51, 52-54 (June 2005). 
29 United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, No. H-02-121, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26870, 
at *5 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2002). The injunction against further violations played a key 
role in later plea negotiations regarding Enron. Andersen simply could not admit to 
another violation of securities laws without endangering its license to audit public 
companies. 
30 see Tarlow, supra note 26, at 52-54. See generally SQUIRES ET AL., supra note 7, at 
120-22. 
3 1  See TOFFLER, supra note 8, at 149. 
32 SQUIRES, supra note 7 at 123. 
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service public companies.33 Nowhere were the firm's systemic problems 
more evident than in its relationship with Enron. 
11. ENRON AND ANDERSEN 
A. THE PRELUDE 
Enron's bankruptcy filing on December 2, 2001 was the largest in 
the history of the United It came on the heels of Enron's 
disclosure that it had overstated its profits for the previous five years by 
33 Both TOFFLER, supra note 8, passim, and SQUIRES ET AL., supra note 7, passim, give 
blow by blow descriptions of the collapse of the f m ' s  ethics. Andersen's culture and its 
involvement in so many of the worst accounting scandals in history played a significant 
role in the government's decision to indict the firm. For a view from a prosecutorial 
perspective, see Kroger, supra note 15, at 87-88 (2005). Kroger minces no words in his 
indictment of Andersen's recent history leading up to and subsequent to Emon: 
Andersen's failure to protect Emon investors was not an isolated 
incident. . . . From 1992 to 1997, for example, Andersen helped 
Waste Management. . . improperly inflate its eamings by $1 billion. . 
. . Andersen was also involved in deceptive accounting at McKesson- 
HBOC (eamings inflated by $300 million), Qwest (earnings inflated 
by $1.2 billion), and WorldCom (earnings inflated by $9 billion) as 
well. This pattern of misconduct . . . suggests that Andersen's failures 
in the Enron case were . . . the result of a pervasive firm culture that 
repeatedly valued the interest of management in positive eamings 
statements over the interest of the shareholders and investing public 
in accurate information. 
Id. 
The Department of Justice was cognizant of Andersen's checkered history. In 
announcing the firm's indictment, Deputy Attorney General Thompson stated that the 
"firm's history of wrongdoing" was a factor in the decision to indict. 
See JOAN MCPHEE & PETER L. WELSH, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S GUIDELINES 




McPhee-Welsh.pdf; see also Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney 
Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Department Components and United States 
Attorneys, Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
2003, http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cfif/corporate_guidelines.htm (noting that "[a] 
corporation, like a natural person is expected to learn from its mistakes. A history of 
similar conduct may be probative of a corporate culture that encouraged, or at least 
condoned, such conduct. . . ."). 
34 In re Enron Corp., 284 B.R. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Claims against the corporation 
exceeded $400 billion. However, WorldCom's bankruptcy in 2002 surpassed even 
Enron's. See In re WorldCom, Inc., No.02-13533, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1401 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 31,2003). Ironically, Andersen had served as WorldCom's auditor as well. 
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nearly $600 million.35 Andersen was Enron's auditor, providing both 
auditing and consulting services. Among its other duties, it had annually 
certified that Enron's financial disclosures complied with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles, or "GAAP."~~ Consequently, the 
fallout from Enron's collapse amid allegations of massive fraud and 
deceptive business practices quickly enveloped Andersen as well. 
The scandal metastasized in January 2002 when Andersen disclosed 
that members of its Houston office (which serviced Enron) had ordered 
employees to shred a great deal of information related to the firm's 
dealings with Enron. Worse still, much of the shredding took place 
when federal investigations of Enron had already commenced and when 
Andersen had reason to know that an investigation of its own role in 
Enron's collapse was imminent. 
Andersen's involvement in Enron's financial mismanagement 
became a secondary matter as both Congress and the United States 
Department of Justice ("DOJ") investigated Andersen's potential 
criminal liability for the shredding. The activities of Andersen and 
Enron during the latter part of 2001 and the first third of 2002, which led 
up to Andersen's subsequent criminal trial, are chronicled briefly below. 
I .  A Problem in Houston 
On August 20, 2001, Sherron Watkins, a former Andersen employee 
and current Enron executive, called an Andersen partner named Jim 
Hecker to discuss her concern that Enron was improperly booking some 
of its  transaction^.^' Specifically, Watkins worried that the company 
was using third party special purpose entities to inflate its earnings and 
35 Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Admits to Overstating Profits by 
About $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES,  Nov. 9, 2001, at C l .  
36 GAAP prohibits auditors from "expressing an opinion or stating affirmatively that 
financial statements or other financial data 'present fairly . . . in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles,' if such information contains any departures 
from accounting principles promulgated by a body designated by the AICPA [American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants] Council to establish such principles." See 
Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles, http://www.fasab.gov/accepted.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006) (quoting the 
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct). 
37 Memorandum from James A. Hecker, Partner, Arthur Andersen, to David B. Duncan 
et al., Arthur Andersen 4 (Aug. 21,2001), 
hap://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron~ander~en082102mem0.pdf. [hereinafter 
Hecker memo]. 
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disguise the magnitude of its debt.38 Following their conversation, 
Hecker wrote a memo to the files that he also forwarded to David 
Duncan, the lead partner on the Enron audit engagement.39 Shortly 
thereafter, the firm formed a special group tasked with sorting out 
possible concerns arising from the firm's involvement with Enron. That 
group included Nancy Temple, an in-house attorney in Andersen's 
Chicago office, who had only recently joined the firm. 
In October 2001, Andersen learned that Enron intended to report 
charges against income of approximately $1.2 billion in its third quarter 
financial statements. On October 9, prior to Enron's public 
announcement, Temple wrote in her notes that a Securities and 
Exchange Commission ("SEC") investigation was "highly probable.'*0 
On October 12, Enron sent Duncan a draft press release describing the 
losses as "non-recurring." Duncan noted in a memo to the files that he 
had advised against such language because investors could either 
misconstrue or misunderstand it.41 He sent a draft of his memo to 
Temple with a request for 
2. Andersen Attempts Damage Control 
On October 12, Temple sent the first in a series of ernails that were 
to loom very large during the trial. In an email to David Duncan, 
Temple recommended that he "consider reminding the Engagement 
Team of [the firm's] document and retention policy. It will be helpful to 
make sure that we have complied with the policy.'"3 Prosecutors 
38 See William C. Powers, Jr. et a]., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative 
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. 172-174 (Feb. 1, 2002), 
http:Nnews.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport~sicreportO20102.pdf. The document 
is commonly known as the "Powers Report." 
39 See Hecker memo supra note 35. 
40 W. Amon Burton, Jr. & John S. Dzienkowski, Reexamining the Role of In-House 
Lawyers After the Conviction of Arthur Andersen in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS & 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS 689, 695 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan, eds. Foundation 
Press 2004). 
4 1 Memorandum from David B. Duncan to The Files on Enron Press Release Discussion, 
http:Nnews.findlaw.com/hdocs/docslenron/dncn2fies 101 50 1 mem.pdf (last visited Aug. 
1,2005). 
42 E-mail from Nancy A. Temple to David B. Duncan (Oct. 16, 2001 8:39 PM), 
http://news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/enr0n/tmp12dunc101601eml.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 
2005). [hereinafter, Memo to the Files on Enron Press Release Discussion]. 
43 Temple's email is included as an appendix to Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 38 at 
750. 
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claimed that the timing of the email indicated that Temple's language 
amounted to a coded directive to shred as many documents as possible.44 
Temple's reply email to Duncan on October 16 regarding Enron's 
draft press release also became central to the disposition of the case. In 
it, Temple made a number of suggestions with respect to Duncan's 
memo, including: 
deleting any reference to Temple or consultations with the legal 
group so as to preserve the attorney-client privilege and to 
reduce the likelihood that she (Temple) "might be a witness, 
which [she] prefer[ed] to avoid." 
deleting language that "might suggest that we [Andersen] have 
concluded the release is misleading.. ." and 
noting that she would consult further with Andersen's legal 
group to see if the firm should take other measures to protect 
itself from potential liability.45 
Enron overrode Duncan's concerns and included the phrase "non- 
recurring" in the final version of the press release.46 Meanwhile, fiom 
October 12 through November 9, 2001, Andersen employees shredded 
millions of Enron-related documents in its files. On November 8, 
Andersen received a subpoena from the SEC requesting all documents 
relating to its work on behalf of Enron. The following day, Duncan 
directed his assistant to send out a mass email to all employees working 
on Enron matters. The subject line of the email read, "No more 
shredding.'*' 
In January 2002, Andersen hired the law firms of Davis Polk & 
Wardwell and Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw to help sort out the 
partnership's responsibilities stemming from the Enron debacle. It 
quickly became apparent that many documents, emails and other 
information that were potentially responsive to the SEC subpoena were 
missing and likely destroyed. Andersen publicly disclosed this 
44 Id. at 696-97. 
45 See Memo to the Files on Enron Press Release Discussion, supra note 40. 
46 See id. 
47 Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 38, at 696-97. However, Duncan's assistant, 
Shannon Adlong testified that the email and its heading were her idea. See Tom Fowler, 
Duncan Aide Tearfully Tells of Boss's Firing, HOUSTON CHRON. ,  June 15, 2002, 
available at http:Nwww.chron.comlcs/CDA/ssistory.inplspecialandersed1434968 (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2005). 
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information in a press release dated January 10, 2002. Five days later, 
Andersen fired David Duncan. 
At this point, it began to look like Andersen might be indicted on 
criminal charges for obstruction of justice. Protracted plea negotiations 
with the DOJ eventually broke down and, on March 7, the firm was 
indicted by a federal grand jury in Houston. On April 6, David Duncan 
pled guilty to felony obstruction of justice charges.48 In his plea, 
Duncan admitted knowing that the SEC might have been interested in 
the documents that he ordered destroyed.49 He also admitted personally 
destroying some of the documents.50 
Andersen's case was set for trial for May 7, 2002. The firm faced 
charges of criminal obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. $1512, 
specifically section (b) (2), the witness tampering provision, which states 
in relevant part: 
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, 
threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts 
to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another 
person, with intent to 
(2) cause or induce any person to 
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, 
or other object, from an official proceeding; 
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with 
intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for 
48 See Cooperation Agreement, United States v. David Duncan (S.D.T.X. 2002), 
h t t p : / / n e w s . f m d l a w . c o m ~ h d o c s l d o c s / e ~ . p d f  (last checked Aug. 9, 
2005). 
49 See id. See also, Tom Fowler, Ex-Andersen Auditor Pleads Guilty, HOUSTON CHRON., 
Apr. 9,2002, available at 
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDNssistory.mpl/special/andersedl434968. 
50 See id. 
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use in an official proceeding . . . shall be [guilty of a 
crime] .51 
In order to convict, prosecutors had to show that someone at 
Andersen had either attempted or actually had "corruptly persuaded"52 
another person to tamper with material relevant to an official 
proceeding. The narrowness of the charge presented a challenge to 
prosecutors. They had to prove more than just corporate malfeasance; 
they instead had to show that a specific Andersen agent committed a 
specific act--corruptly persuading-and that said act caused or intended 
to cause another person to impede official access to material relevant to 
the investigation.53 
Prosecuting and convicting corporations poses many challenges, 
including obvious hurdles to successfully imputing intent and actions to 
incorporeal legal entities. Over the years, several methods have arisen 
'' 18 U.S.C. $ 1512 (b)(2) (2005). Following the raft of accounting scandals of the last 
several years, Congress revised $1512 as part of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. 18 U.S.C. $ 
1512(c) now includes a provision prohibiting individuals from corruptly altering, 
destroying, or concealing a document with the intent to impede its use un an official 
proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. $ 15 12(c)(l). Section 15 12(c)(2) is even more sweeping. It 
prohibits individuals from corruptly obstructing, influencing or impeding any official 
proceeding or attempting to do so. 18 U.S.C. $ 1512(c)(2). The broad scope of this 
language seems to cover virtually any interference with official proceedings. See Keith 
Palfin & Sandhya Prabhu, Obstruction of Justice, 40 AM. CFUM. L. REV. 873,899 (2003). 
The amendments to $1512 (and Sarbanes-Oxley in general) have received mixed 
reviews. One commentator notes that the law was enacted so quickly and with so little 
discussion that the end result is a disorganized hodgepodge that amounts to little more 
than political grandstanding. See Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Afermath: 
Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 67 1,672 (2002). 
'* Courts have struggled with the meaning of "corruptly persuade." See, e.g., United 
States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996) (defining corrupt persuasion as 
persuasion with "improper purpose"); United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 489 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (defining ' ~ & ~ t l ~ ' '  as for "improper purposes" renders the term superfluous 
when statute already has intent requirement); United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 
1301 (11th Cir. 1998) (following Thompson to find "corruptly persuading" means 
persuade for improper purposes and phrase is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad). 
In reversing Andersen's conviction, the Supreme Court noted that "corruptly" is 
commonly associated with "wrongful, immoral, or depraved" behavior but declined to 
explicitly define the term, observing that "[tlhe outer limits of this element need not be 
explored here because the jury instructions at issue simply failed to convey the requisite 
consciousness of wrongdoing." Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct 2 129, 
2136 (2005). 
'' The jury instructions, which lay out the prosecution's burden can be found infra at 
note 82. 
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for prosecuting collective entities, including respondeat superior and the 
''co11ective knowledge" doctrine.54 Each doctrine is examined briefly 
below. 
Most corporate criminal liability stems from the notion of 
respondeat superior; a doctrine holding corporations liable for the 
actions and intentions of their agents.55 Courts interpret this to mean that 
a corporate entity is responsible for criminal acts carried out by an agent 
if that agent was acting within the scope of employment and with the 
intent to benefit the c~rpora t ion .~~ This principle is generally read 
broadly to include actions taken by agents in specific contravention to 
the instructions of their superiors but which nonetheless aimed to further 
the good of the c~rporat ion.~~ 
The "collective knowledge" doctrine is a more recent and 
controversial method for obtaining criminal  conviction^.^^ Under this 
principle, entity intent may be divined through imputing to the corporate 
54 Other methods for determining intent include willful blindness as well as methods 
relating to conspiracies, liability following mergers and dissolutions, and misprision of 
felony. Since these are not relevant to the Andersen case, I do not discuss them here. 
" S e e  e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson R. R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 
(1909) (holding that corporations may be "held responsible for and charged with the 
knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within the authority conferred upon 
them."). 
j6 See, e.g., United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958) (finding 
partnership liable for acts committed by its agents acting within the scope of their 
employment); In re Hellenic, Inc., 252 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding an agent's 
knowledge may be imputed to a corporation where "agent is acting within the scope of 
his authority and where the knowledge relates to matters within the scope of that 
authority"). For further discussion, see Annie Geraghty, Corporate Criminal Liability, 
39 AM. CRIM L. REV. 327 (2002); Jonathan C. Poling & Kimberly Murphy White, 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 38 AM.  CRIM. L. REV. 525 (2001). 
57 See United States v. Portac, Inc., 869 F.2d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 1989) (afirming 
corporation's conviction although the agent who committed the crime was expressly 
advised by supervisor that the corporation did not countenance illegal behavior); United 
States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that 
the fact employees' actions were illegal and contrary to corporate policy "does not 
absolve [defendant] of legal responsibility for their acts"); see also Dan K .  Webb, et. al., 
Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive Criminal Liability, 49 Bus. LAW 
617, 624 (1994) ("[Elven when an employee acts contrary to compliance program 
olicies and specific directives, the corporation can be held criminally liable.") 
See, e.g., PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE REsmNsIBILIrn 1 (1984) 
("The idea of collective, let alone corporate responsibility has been frequently and loudly 
decried as a vulgarism and red-lined from residency in the better moral 
neighborhoods."). 
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entity the sum of the knowledge of all of its employees.59 Corporations 
often evade liability by compartmentalizing responsibility. This strategy 
prevents any one person from knowing the fill extent of the criminal 
activity. Therefore, no one employee attains the requisite mens rea for 
the crime alleged. To combat this tactic, courts have reasoned that "[tlhe 
aggregate of those components represents the corporation's knowledge 
of a particular operation."60 If no one employee had the necessary intent 
or knowledge for a given criminal act but each had the intent to carry out 
part of the crime, then their respective intents and actions can be 
aggregated into one collective intent and action for which the 
corporation may be prosecuted. 
In the Andersen case, the judge specifically excluded collective 
knowledge as a means of convicting the firm.61 Consequently, 
prosecutors had to rely solely on respondeat superior. This meant that 
the jury needed to unanimously conclude that a particular agent 
knowingly and corruptly persuaded others to obstruct justice. 
Nevertheless, following a query from the prosecutors sought to 
inject a novel interpretation of collective knowledge into the jury 
deliberations. And, despite her earlier instructions and a highly 
questionable legal rationale, the judge permitted it. 
The judge's ruling, as well as the prosecution's rationale. constituted 
a radical departure from traditional theories of corporate criminal 
liability. Appreciating the controversial nature of the ruling requires 
contextualizing it within the trial. The next section reviews the events 
leading up to the jury's query. 
'' United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987); see also United 
States v. F m  & Home Sav. Ass'n, 932 F.2d 1256, 1259 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
when multiple employees participate in illegal activities, knowledge of those activities 
may be imputed to employer); United States v. Penagaricano-Soler, 91 1 F2d 833, 843 
(1st Cir. 1990) (imputing various employees' knowledge gained during course of 
employment to employer). Other methods for determining intent irrelevant to the 
Andersen case are not discussed here. 
60 Bank of New England, 821 F2d at 856. 
'' Transcript of Proceedings at 6343, reprinted in Brief for the Petitioner, Jury 
Instructions 2005 WL 47401 3 at * 21 2 [hereinafter Transcript of Proceedings]. See also 
infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
62 See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Government's Case 
The government's case featured David Duncan as its star witness.63 
Prosecutors believed that Duncan's guilty plea and subsequent 
admissions demonstrated the firm's intent to thwart the SEC 
investigation and thereby obstruct justice.64 Duncan's behavior 
following the Enron revelations, as well as the behavior of other partners 
at the firm, showed knowing and corrupt persuasion. It also showed that 
the firm's intent to obstruct justice began much earlier than the 
document destruction order.65 
In their opening statement, prosecutors described how a group of 
partners at Andersen decided to shred documents when they realized an 
SEC inquiry was inevitable. According to Assistant U.S. Attorney Matt 
Friedrich, "There was a day when a . . . small group of partners at Arthur 
Andersen knew that the law was going to come knocking at their door, 
asking a lot of questions about their firm. They made a choice to do 
what they could while they thought that nobody was looking." Andersen 
"knew the SEC was coming," he continued, "Nancy Temple wrote it 
down."66 
The government's case focused on Duncan but devoted significant 
time to Temple as well. Duncan's corrupt persuasion consisted of 
instructing his staff to destroy thousands of Enron-related documents to 
keep them from in~esti~ators.~ '  Prosecutors suggested that Temple's 
emails had also corruptly persuaded Andersen employees to shred.68 
63 David Ivanovich and Mary Flood, Andersen Faces Fire In Court This Week: 
Conviction Could Spell End of Firm, HOUSTON CHRON., May 6, 2002, available at 
h t t p : / l w w w . c h r o n . c o m / c s / C D A / p r i n t s t o ~ l 3 9 8 2 2 4 .  
64 Kurt Eichenwald, Early Inquiry Fear Seen at Andersen, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,2002, at 
Al.  
65 Id. Eichenwald describes the prosecution's "collective knowledge" argument: "In 
essence, the actions of a wide array of Andersen officials can be used to argue that the 
firm, as a whole, was anticipating an inquiry and had a criminal intent when the 
shredding began." 
See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron 's Many Strands: The Trial; Judge Says Andersen S Past 
Can Be Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2002, at C6. Transcript of Proceedings at *51, 
United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 2002 Extra LEXIS 454 (S.D. TX May 8, 2002) 
(No. CR.A. H-02-0121) [hereinafter Trial Transcript]. 
67 See Tom Fowler, Duncan Sentencing Delayed and Given to Another Judge, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Aug. 2, 2002, available at 
http://www.chron.com/lcs/cda/ssistory.mpl/specIaandersed15 1858 1 (last visited Aug. 
9, 2005). 
68 See Trial Transcript, supra note 64, at *2 1. 
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They pointed as well to a videotape of Michael Odum from October 10, 
2001-two days prior to his receipt of Temple's ernail to Duncan- 
giving instructions to firm employees about destroying documents and 
noting that (hypothetically speaking) it would be "great" if records were 
shredded up to the day the firm learned of a lawsuit.69 
Another damning fact lay in Andersen's billing records. They 
showed the fm billing Enron for over $700,000 during the period of 
October through November 2001, for time spent dealing with the SEC 
investigation of ~ n r o n . ~ '  The records indicated that multiple Andersen 
partners knew of the inquiry at the same time Andersen personnel were 
destroying relevant  document^.^' Thus, prosecutors asserted, the jury 
could plausibly find either that Duncan, Temple or Odum formed the 
"cormpt persuader" behind the firm's obstruction of justice. 
2. Andersen 's Defense 
By contrast, Andersen maintained that the government's case 
collapsed under the weight of its internal contradictions. As Rusty 
Hardin, Andersen's lead trial attorney argued, "This is a document- 
destruction charge by the government based on evidence and documents 
that we [Andersen] preserved and gave them. Is there some irony in 
that?"72 He compared the government's case to the children's book, 
Where's Waldo, recommending that the jurors continually ask 
?"73 themselves, "Who are the corrupt persuaders. 
In the defense's view, the much ballyhooed emails and memos from 
Nancy Temple were little more than standard legal advice on document 
retention for audit clients. Several Andersen partners testified that they 
did not view Temple's email about the firm's document retention policy 
as anything other than prudent l a ~ ~ e r i n ~ , ' ~  a view later echoed by some 
69 See Eichenwald, supra note 64. Specifically, Odum stated that, ""if [documents are] 
destroyed in the course of normal policy and litigation is filed the next day, that's great ... 
we've followed our own policy and whatever there was that might have been of interest 
to somebody is gone and irretrievable." United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP 374 F.3d 
281 (5th Cir. 2004). 
70 Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 38, at 701. 
71 Id. 
72 Trial Transcript, supra note 64, at *68. 
73 See id. at *78. 
74 See Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Andersen Partner Says He Knew Data Would Be Destroyed. 
N . Y .  TIMES, May 14,2002, at C4. 
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in the legal co~nmunity.~~ Andersen gave even less credence to the 
argument that Michael Odum's narrative on the training video amounted 
to criminal behavior. Hardin told the jury to start by asking themselves 
"if he is on this videotape telling people to do something wrong, why is 
7,376 he doing it on a videotape. 
Duncan's testimony emerged as surprisingly problematic as well. 
The government contended that his actions and subsequent guilty plea 
demonstrated the company's guilt. However, Andersen used Duncan's 
own testimony to undermine the notion that he had acted with the 
requisite criminal intent. Unfamiliar with the firm's document retention 
policy and ignorant of the legalities relating to document destruction, 
Duncan admitted that he did not know at the time that he was acting 
illegally. He testified that at the time he ordered the documents 
shredded he did not believe he was committing a crime. He had thought 
it legal to destroy documents until the firm actually received a subpoena 
from the SEC.'~ 
Furthermore, when Duncan directed subordinates to destroy 
documents, he instructed them to follow the firm's document retention 
policy. The policy required the destruction of all records that were not 
necessary to explain the accounting decisions reflected in the primary 
work papers.78 Duncan told them to go no further than the policy 
allowed. He also acknowledged directing the Enron engagement team to 
75 See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, The Flaw in the Andersen Verdict, N . Y .  TIMES, June 18, 
2002, at A23. Commentators differ as to whether Temple's email was appropriate, 
although many agree that it was "skating very close to the line." Tom Fowler, Lawyers 
Fear Legal Impact of Andersen, HOUSTON CHRON., June 25, 2002, available at 
httD:Nwww.chron.co~cs/CDNssisto~.mvl/s~ecial/andersed1468838 (last visited Aug. 
9,2005). 
76 See Eichenwald, supra note 64; Trial Transcript, supra note 64, at *84. 
77 Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Auditors Knew About Federal Inquiry, Records at Trial 
Show, N . Y .  TIMES, May 15, 2002 at C10. Duncan was mistaken as to the policy's 
requirements. The policy specifically states that "[iln the event. . . AA . . . is advised of 
litigation or subpoenas regarding a particular engagement, the related information should 
not be destroyed." Andersen Policy Statement, entitled Practice Administration: Client 
Engagement Information - Organization, Retention and Destruction, Statement No. 760, 
Feb. 2000, Section 4.5.4, available at h~://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/enon ( last 
visited Aug. 1, 2005). The policy goes on to state that "[rleasons for extended retention 
might include regulatory agency investigations (e.g. by the SEC), pending tax cases, or 
other legal action in connection with which the files would be necessary or useful. In 
such cases, material in the files cannot be altered or deleted." Id. at 4.7.1. 
78 See Andersen Policy Statement, Practice Administration: Client Engagement 
Information - Organization, Retention and Destruction, Statement No. 760, Section 
2.0(4) (Feb. 2000). available at http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/enron. 
Heinonline - -  13 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 199 2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 6  
200 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 13:2 
retain copies of a draft memorandum that laid out the evolution of 
Enron's accounting problems.79 
According to Duncan, Temple directed that both the incorrect and 
the corrected version of the memorandum regarding Enron's press 
release be retained in the files:80 Duncan also testified that he 
deliberately retained documents discussing Sherron Watkins' 
allegations. These documents included potentially damaging statements 
about Enron and its relationship with ~ndersen .~ '  Such actions seem 
uncharacteristic of a firm seeking to cover-up wrongdoing and to erase 
its paper trail. 
In general, Duncan's testimony proved less helpful to the 
government's case than prosecutors had hoped.82 He appeared to admit 
that he lacked the requisite intent for the crime to which he had pled 
guilty. Given this apparent absence of intent, portraying Duncan as the 
"corrupt persuader" that the statute requires became increasingly 
difficult. If Duncan did not have the mens rea for the crime, then it 
could not be imputed to the firm through him. This placed the 
government's case in considerable peril. 
Nevertheless, Duncan's testimony was not an unalloyed positive for 
the defense. Both sides found themselves in uncomfortable positions. 
Andersen had to argue that, irrespective of his guilty plea, Duncan had 
not committed any crime. For its part, the prosecution found itself 
reassuring the jury that, despite new evidence to the contrary, their star 
witness was in fact a criminal.83 
'' Kurt Eichenwald, Trial Judge and Lawyer for Andersen Tangle in Houston 
Courtroom Shouting Match, N . Y .  T~MES, May 17,2002, at C7. 
Id. -~~ 
g'  Id. 
82 See Tom Fowler, Duncan Testimony Pleases Defense, HOUSTON CHRON., May 19, 
2002, available at http:Nwww.chron.cornlcs /CDA/ss i s tory .mp~1416644 .  
83 See Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 38, at 701. 
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3. The Jury Instructions 
After both sides rested, Judge Harmon instructed the jury that to 
convict under 18 U.S.C. 5 1512(b)(2), it must unanimously find that 
Andersen, through an agent or employee: 
acted knowingly with corrupt intent 
to cause or persuade one of Andersen's employees 
to withhold a document from an official proceeding, 
or alter, destroy or conceal an object 
with intent to impair its availability in an official proceeding84 
84 See Trial Transcript, supra note 64, at *7-33. The instructions read in relevant part: 
In order to prove Andersen's guilt . . . the Government must prove each of the 
following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First, that . . . the Andersen firm through its agents corruptly persuaded or 
attempted to corruptly persuade another person or persons; and second, that 
Andersen through its agents acted knowingly or with intent to cause or induce 
another person or persons to, A, withhold a record or document from an 
official proceeding or, B, alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with 
intent to impair the object's availability for use in an official proceeding. 
The word, quote, corruptly, close quote, means having an improper purpose. 
An improper purpose for this case is an intent to subvert, undermine, or 
impede the fact-finding ability of an official proceeding. 
Thus, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that an agent, such as a partner, of 
Andersen acting within the scope of his or her employment induced or 
attempted to induce another employee or partner of the firm or some other 
person to withhold, alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object and that the 
agent did so with the intent, at least in part, to subvert, undermine, or impede 
the fact-finding ability of an official proceeding, then you may find that 
Andersen committed the first element of the charged offense. 
The second element of the charged offense . . . is that Andersen, through its 
agents, acted knowingly and with the intent to cause or induce another person 
to withhold a record or a document from an official proceeding or to alter, 
destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object's 
integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding. 
An act is done with the intent to impair the integrity or availability of a 
document or object only if it is undertaken with the specific purpose of making 
the document or object unavailable for use in an official proceeding. 
However, the Government is not required to prove that Andersen's sole or even 
primary intent was to cause another person to make a document or object 
unavailable for use in an official proceeding. You may find that this intent 
element has been established if you conclude that Andersen acted, at least in 
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The judge explained that the prosecution did not need to prove that 
the illicit acts of Andersen agents or employees were approved by the 
partnership or accorded with its policies. A partnership is responsible 
for actions taken by agents within the scope of their employment 
regardless of whether the agent acted contrary to instructions and/or 
against company 
After seven days of deliberation, the jury reported that it was 
deadlocked. The judge gave an Allen chargeg6 and instructed jurors to 
continue deliberating. Shortly thereafter, the jury sent out Note #9, 
which asked: 
If each of us believes that one Andersen agent acted 
knowingly and with corrupt intent, is it [necessary] for 
all of us to believe it was the same agent. 
Can one believe it was agent A, another believe it was 
agent B, and another believe it agent c.*~ 
part, with the intent to cause another person to make a document or object 
unavailable for use in an official proceeding. 
. . .  
[I]t is not necessary for the Government to prove that Andersen knew that its 
conduct violated the criminal law. Thus, even if Andersen honestly and 
sincerely believed that its conduct was lawful, you may find Andersen guilty if 
you conclude that Andersen acted corruptly and with the intent to make 
documents unavailable for an official proceeding. 
Moreover, the Government is not required to prove that Andersen was 
successful or likely to succeed in subverting, undermining, or impeding the 
fact-finding ability of an official proceeding. Nor is the Government required 
to prove that Andersen was successful or likely to succeed in making 
documents unavailable for that proceeding. It is Andersen's purpose and intent, 
not the success of its effort that the Govenunent must prove as elements of the 
charged offense. 
Id. at *24-29. 
See id. 
"See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). An "Allen" charge urges jurors 
to put aside their differences and come to a verdict. Also known as a "dynamite charge," 
the instruction aims to overcome or "explode" the reservations of holdout jurors. See 
Stephen Landsman, Death of An Accountant: The Jury Convicts Arthur Andersen of 
Obstruction of Justice, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 12 18 (2003). 
87 Jonathan Weil et a]., Dramatic Question From Jury Could Shape Andersen's Fate, 
WALL ST. J., June 14, 2002, at Al .  
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This query presented an issue of first impression for the court. In 
fact, as subsequently became clear, no court anywhere had ever 
addressed a question even similar to it. 
Unsurprisingly, the two sides took opposite positions. Following 
preliminary arguments, the parties briefed the issue and then argued it 
again the next day. Andersen argued that the jurors must unanimously 
agree on the actorlagent of the corporation who committed the crime 
while the government maintained that the law did not require jury 
unanimity on this point. 
Judge Harmon ruled in favor of the prosecution. She informed the 
jury that "[tlo find Andersen guilty as charged you must find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that at least one agent of Andersen acted with the 
required knowledge and intent, but you need not all agree unanimously 
that it was the same agent of Andersen who acted with the required 
knowledge and intent."88 
Eventually, the jury broke its deadlock and returned a verdict of 
guilty. It did not have to rely on the court's answer to Note # 9 because 
it managed to reach consensus on the identity of the responsible 
Andersen agent. According to post-verdict interviews, the jury 
concluded that Nancy Temple's email to Duncan suggesting the deletion 
of "some language that might suggest we have concluded the [Enron 
press] release is misleading" showed that she was the "corrupt 
persuader."89 The news of the jury's theory of guilt shocked virtually 
everyone involved with the case because neither side had focused on that 
email during the trial.90 
111. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE RULING ON NOTE #9 
While I believe the Supreme Court correctly overturned the 
verdict:' the jury's decision is not my focus here. The Court reversed 
88 See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 59 at *6343. 
89 Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 38, at 704. See also Mary Flood, Decision By 
Jurors Hinged on Memo, HOUSTON CHRON., June 19, 2002, avaialbe at 
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpWspeciaWmdersedl456547. 
90 See Mary Flood & Tom Fowler, Jury Finds Andersen Guilty, Says Shredding Meant 
Nothing, available at HOUSTON CHRON., June 15, 2002, 
http:Nwww.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/speciaWemodl455557. 
91 See supra note 2 .  
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because the jury had been improperly instructed regarding the nature of 
the required mens  re^.'^ As a result, it did not have to conclude that the 
guilty agent knew she was acting wrongfully.93 This article focuses on a 
related but distinct issue-the trial judge's ruling on Jury Note # 9. 
Judge Harmon decreed that the jury did not need to agree on who at 
Andersen possessed the culpable mens rea or on who acted upon it. 
Though mooted for purposes of the trial, the ruling remains important as 
the sole judicial pronouncement within an unsettled area of law. 
A finding that juries need not unanimously agree on the identity of 
the bad actor within a corporation gives wide latitude to prosecutors. 
Under this rationale, prosecutors can present multiple theories involving 
any number of potential bad actors. All they need to do is convince the 
jury that someone did something rather than that a particular person did 
a particular thing. 
Allowing jurors this leeway violates the foundational principle of 
federal law that juries must unanimously convict in criminal trials.94 It 
also allows prosecutors to offer multiple theories of guilt, not in the 
hopes that the jury will settle on one, but rather than it will settle on 
some of them. This scattershot jurisprudence will markedly shift the 
dynamics of criminal trials and will almost certainly spur challenges by 
the defense bar.95 
The ruling erred on a more subtle, rhetorical level as well. By 
validating the government's position, the court adopted a stance that 
strips agents of agency while attributing consciousness to a legal 
92 See Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct 2129, 2131-32 (2005) ("We 
hold that the jury instructions failed to convey properly the elements of a 'comp[t] 
persuas[ion]' conviction under 8 1512(b) and therefore reverse.") (alteration in original). 
93 See id. at 2136 ("The instructions . . . diluted the meaning of 'corruptly' so that it 
covered innocent conduct."). 
94 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
95 See David M .  Zornow & Christopher J. Gunther, After Andersen, Can Companies Get 
a Meaningful Jury Trial? N.Y. L.J.,  Jul. 8,2002, at 9. 
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fiction.96 Understanding the full dimensions of the error and its 
implications requires a close analysis of the issues raised by Note # 9. 
Recall that the question the jury presented to the judge involved 
whether it could convict Andersen if all the jurors agreed that someone 
at the entity had acted knowingly and with corrupt intent but could not 
agree as to exactly who. They wished to know whether it was 
permissible for some of them to believe that the wrongdoer was Agent 
A, others to believe it was Agent B, and so forth.97 
I .  Andersen: Unanimity Is Required 
Andersen argued that the jury must unanimously agree on the actor 
who committed the crime. Otherwise, the jury could not possibly agree 
on intent, a crucial element of the crime.98 The entity can be found to 
have a particular state of mind only if one of its partners or employees 
had that state of mind.99 Intent cannot be disaggregated among multiple 
actors. 
Corporations act through their agents. To commit a crime, those 
agents must possess criminal intent. It follows that to convict, the jury 
must agree on the identity of the agent who intended to commit the 
crime. "[Tlhe jury can find that Andersen had a particular intent only if 
the jurors unanimously find that a particular person at the firm had that 
state of mind. Absent that finding, the jury simply cannot conclude that 
96 AS Chief Justice Marshall observed in United States v. Deveauw, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 
86 (1 809), a corporation is "certainly not a citizen," it is rather an "invisible, intangible, 
and artificial being . . . [a] mere legal entity." Marshall reasoned that corporations could 
not, therefore, invoke diversity jurisdiction. Less than fifty years later, in Marshall v. 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 327-28 (1853), the Court 
reconsidered, holding that corporations may invoke diversity jurisdiction despite the fact 
that they are "invisible" and "intangible" on the basis that their stockholders are 
presumed to hold citizenship in the state of incorporation. One commentator observes 
that this decision effectively meant that "corporations gained entry into the federal 
judicial system as participants equal in standing to individuals" in civil disputes. 
Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 833, 835 (2000). Fifty years later, the Court ushered in what Friedman described 
as "the modem era of corporate criminal liability." Id. 
97 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
98 Brief of Andersen at 1, United States v. Arthur Andersen, No. CP.A. H-02-0212 (S.D. 
TX. June 14,2002). 
99 Id. at 2. 
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Andersen, as an entity, had any state of mind at And, without the 
required mens rea, there can be no guilty verdict. 
2. Prosecution: Identity is Not an Element and Unanimity is 
Not Required 
The government sought to cast the issue solely as one of identity, 
which it argued was not an element of the crime and therefore did not 
require jury unanimity. In its view, "the identity of a specific corporate 
actor is not an element of the offense, but rather a method and means by 
which a corporation can be found guilty of a crime."lo1 To find 
otherwise would hamstring corporate criminal prosecutions and shield 
corporations from liability.Io2 
According to this view, corporate actors are merely the method and 
means through which the entity commits crimes.103 The act and intent 
lie within the corporation itself. Agents are tools, nothing more. As the 
prosecution argued, the Andersen agents were analogous to guns used in 
a robbery: "All [the jury has] to agree on is that a gun was used, not the 
same gun . . . . Just think of (Andersen partners) as guns."104 Similarly, 
the jury did not have to agree which Andersen agent obstructed justice, 
just that the firm itself committed the crime. 
C. THE JUDGE SIDES WITH THE PROSECUTION: IDENTITYAS MEANS 
The judge's ruling in favor of the government implicitly accepted 
the premise that the identity of the corrupt persuader forms a means 
rather than an element of the crime of obstruction of justice. By this 
reasoning, the elements of the crime as enumerated in the statute include 
mens rea ("knowingly . . . corruptly") and actus reus (persuading 
another person to "alter destroy mutilate, or conceal an object with intent 
to impair . . . an official proceeding . . .").Io5 Identity is not explicitly set 
forth in the statute and therefore forms a mere means of the crime's 
commission. Since it is settled law that unanimity is not required when 
loo Id. at 3. 
lo' Brief of Gov't at 5, United States v. Arthur Andersen, No. CP.A. H-02-0212 (S.D. 
TX. June 14,2002). 
'02 See generally, id. at 4. 
Io3 Id. at 5 .  
Io4 Greg Farrell, Andersen J u r y  May Be Leaning Toward Guilty, USA TODAY, June 13, 
2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/energy/enrod2002-06-13-andersen- 
jury-deliberations.htm. 
Io5 18 U.S.C. $$ 1512(b) (2002). 
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determining the means of a crime,Io6 the jury need not reach consensus 
regarding the identity of the guilty agent. 
By way of illustration, consider a case where the defendant allegedly 
used the threat of force to carry out a robbery (threat of force comprising 
an element of the crime of robbery). The jury need not unanimously 
agree on the nature of the threat."' Some jurors might believe that the 
defendant used a knife while others might think he used a gun. The law 
does not require consensus on the manner or means in which the 
defendant satisfied the element; it requires only that all agree that the 
element itself-using the threat of force-be satisfied.Io8 
In the instant case, Arthur Andersen, LLP - not individual agents 
of the firm-was standing trial. Consequently, the jury needed to 
unanimously find that the firm had the requisite mens rea. It did not 
need to unanimously agree on how the firm came by that mens rea and 
in whom it resided. If some jurors felt that one agent possessed criminal 
intent and other jurors believed the intent lay with another, that 
difference of opinion was immaterial for purposes of convi~ t ion . '~~  
D. IDENTITY IS NOTAN ELEMENT BUT IT IS ALSO NOT THE ISSUE 
1.  Identity Can Be Crucial to Determining the Intent and the Act 
While the prosecution's reasoning has a surface allure, it does not 
withstand close scrutiny. According to the prosecution's logic, the issue 
reads as follows: 
The jury is uncertain as to the identity of the corrupt persuader 
within Andersen; 
Identity is not an element of 18 U.S.C. $ 15 12; 
Therefore the jury need not agree on the identity of the corrupt 
persuader within Andersen. 
106 See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1991) (plurality opinion) ("We have 
never suggested that in returning general verdicts . . . the jurors should be required to 
agree upon a single means of commission , any more than the indictments were required 
to specify one alone.") 
107 See id.; McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 (1990) (Blackmun, J., 
concuning). 
lo' See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 81 7 (1999). 
Brief of Gov't, supra note 99, at 2. 
Heinonline - -  13 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 2 0 7  2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 6  
208 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 13:2 
The flaw in this reasoning lies with the conflation of means and 
mens rea. Contending that the question hinges on whether identity is a 
means or an element of the statute steers the court into an area of 
unsettled law--distinguishing between means and elements"0-rather 
than toward the uncontroversial and long-settled principle that jury 
unanimity is required on the issue of mens rea itself."' In addition, even 
assuming identity is not an element of the crime, the court still erred in 
its ruling. 
Assume, arguendo, that identity is a means rather than an element 
of the crime. There is some basis for such an assumption in the 
corporate context.Il2 In large corporations, one can hide one's doings 
beneath layers of bureaucratic camouflage, sometimes rendering it 
impossible to identify culpable individuals definitively. If identity were 
a nonnegotiable prerequisite for prosecution, it would severely hamper 
efforts to rein in corporate crime."3 Instead, it would seem sensible to 
permit convictions of the corporate entity while allowing the identity of 
the guilty agent[s] to remain ob~cure ."~ 
Consider the following fictional example: 
A memo from the Legal Department of Beelzebub, Inc. 
dated January 9, 2005 orders the shredding of all records 
relating to the last three quarterly earnings statements. A 
day after the accounting department complies, the SEC 
subpoenas the now destroyed records as part of an 
ongoing fraud investigation. Based on these facts, it 
appears that one or more people at Beelzebub violated 
18 U.S.C. 5 15 12 (b)(2) by corruptly persuading other 
employees to destroy evidence.Il5 However, it is not 
"O See Schad, 501 U.S. at 634-35 (citing cases "deriving primarily from" United States 
v. Gipson, 553 F2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977). 
1 1 1  See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) 
("[Elxistence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of 
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. Intent generally remains an indispensable 
element of a criminal offense.") (internal citation omitted); but see Schad, 501 U.S. at 
639-40 (holding that a jury need not unanimously agree whether a defendant is guilty of 
IS' degree murder under premeditated murder or felony murder, which have different 
mens reas, so long as all jurors believe one of the two.) 
' I 2  Brief of Gov't, supra note 99, at 5-7. 
' I 3  see id. at 5. 
"4 See id. 
"' Under the revised statute, the actions would violate 18 U.S.C. 5 1512 (c) (2002) as 
well since the agent corruptly obstructed an official proceeding. 
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clear precisely who did it. Beelzebub's Legal 
Department has over 700 members. Even assuming the 
offender actually belonged to that department, locating 
him or her remains nearly impossible. 
Though diligent investigation fails to conclusively 
identify the responsible parties, the government indicts 
anyway and the case goes to trial. The defense moves 
for a directed verdict, arguing that the jury could not 
reasonably convict because it cannot identify the bad 
actor within the corporation. The judge denies the 
motion and the case goes to the jury. Can the jury 
convict on these facts? 
Yes, it likely could. Because Beelzebub, Inc. is on trial and not an 
individual, a jury could reasonably conclude that an agent of Beelzebub 
obstructed justice while never knowing the actual identity of the 
agent.'16 Knowing the agent's name is not necessary to believing that 
s h e  was an agent of the corporation who knowingly and corruptly 
persuaded other employees to tamper with evidence. Convicting 
Beelzebub on this basis would not sound any of the procedural alarms 
raised by Jury Note # 9. Understanding why this is so requires that we 
recognize the distinctions between the Beelzebub example and the 
Andersen case. 
2. There Was No Unanimity Regarding Either the Mens Rea or 
Actus Reus 
In the above example, the jury unanimously concluded that a 
particular unnamed agent (who we'll call "Lucifer") at Beelzebub did a 
particular thing (sent a memo directing that relevant documents be 
destroyed) at a particular time (January 9, 2005). The jury further 
'I6 While no case law speaks definitively to this issue, there are cases suggesting that 
knowledge of the culpable agent's identity is not a prerequisite to a corporation's 
conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 12 1 F.2d 376, 4 1 1 (7th Cir. 
1941) (detailing how a corporation was convicted of conspiracy though all defendant 
officers and agents were acquitted; court concluded that unnamed co-conspirators could 
have been responsible for the company's actions); President Coolidge (Dollar S.S. Co.) 
v. United States, 101 F2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939) (involving steamship company convicted 
of discharging waste-a strict liability offense-though responsible crewmember was 
not known); see also Stacey Neumann Vu, Note: Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Patchwork Verdicts and the Problem of Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
459, 472-73 (2004) (discussing related phenomenon of inconsistent verdicts where 
agents are acquitted and corporation is nevertheless convicted). 
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concluded that Lucifer knew an investigation was imminent and 
intended to corruptly persuade other employees to tamper with evidence. 
All of the elements of the crime are therefore satisfied. The jury 
unanimously agreed on the nature of the bad act and the intent of the 
actor. Though the specific identity of the actorlagent remains unknown, 
the jury is satisfied that she exists and that her actions and intent violated 
the law. 
Contrast the Beelzebub scenario with the Andersen case. In 
Andersen, the prosecution presented competing theories of the actus 
reus of corrupt persuasion. It suggested that it could have been 
Duncan's directing subordinates to shred, Temple's emails regarding the 
document retention policy or the wording of a memo, or Odum's video 
presentation encouraging the destruction of audit workpapers up to the 
day the firm learns of a lawsuit. 
These actions were carried out by different people on different days. 
For any of them to be criminal, the responsible individual must have had 
guilty intent."' The act of knowing corrupt persuasion is inseparable 
from the intent to do so. One cannot innocently yet cormptly 
persuade11g nor can the intent to corruptly persuade reside with someone 
other than the persuader. 
If six jurors believed Nancy Temple corruptly persuaded, then those 
same jurors by definition must have believed that she intended to 
corruptly persuade as well. If six other jurors believed that David 
Duncan was the corrupt persuader, then those jurors similarly believed 
that Duncan intended to corruptly persuade. If six believed that Temple 
did it and six that Duncan did it, then they jury lacked consensus as to 
117 For purposes of 18 U.S.C. $ 1512 (2002), the requisite guilty intent is knowledge. 
l L 8  The Supreme Court faulted the judge's failure to adequately explain that knowing 
corrupt persuasion necessarily involves knowing of the wrongfulness of the act. See 
Arthur Anderson LLP v. United States, 125 S.Ct 2129, 2 136 (2005) ("Only persons 
conscious of wrongdoing can be said to 'knowingly . . . corruptly persuad[e]."') (citing 
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 602 (1995)). I am making a different point. I 
submit that regardless of one's knowledge of the legality of the act, it is self-evident that 
one cannot knowingly corruptly persuade without knowing one is doing so. 
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the existence of a corrupt persuader. Conviction was therefore 
impermissible. l 9  
If the jury were to conclude (as it ultimately did) that Temple 
corruptly persuaded other employees to obstruct justice, then the jury 
also had to believe that she intended to do so. The same would hold true 
for Duncan or Odurn. It follows that when the jury deadlocked, the 
disagreement involved more than just the identity of the corrupt 
persuader. The deadlock arose because some jurors believed that Person 
X committed Crime A and some believed that Person Y committed 
Crime B. This amounts to a disagreement not just over identity but over 
the nature of the crime itself. 
By way of further illustration, consider the following two analogous 
hypotheticals. 
Jane Smith is standing trial for armed robbery. 
Prosecutors offer two different scenarios for her guilt: 1) 
that she robbed a convenience store on July 4 and, 2) 
that she robbed a bank on July 14.'~' When the case 
goes to the jury, half of the jury believes that she robbed 
the convenience store but not the bank while the other 
half believe that she robbed the bank but not the 
convenience store. Though all the jurors agree that she 
committed armed robbery, they do not agree as to when, 
where or how. Under these circumstances, it would be 
manifestly unconstitutional to convict her because the 
jury has not unanimously concluded that she committed 
any crime. All the jurors feel she is guilty of something, 
but they disagree as to what.12' 
'I9 Those jurors who subscribed to one theory of guilt (i.e., that Temple did it) must not 
have believed that anyone else was also guilty. If, for example, the jurors who thought 
that Temple obstructed justice thought that Duncan obstructed justice as well, and the six 
other jurors thought that Duncan and no one else obstructed justice, then there would 
have been unanimity on the issue of Duncan's guilt. That would have obviated any 
deadlock. 
I2O Though usehl as an illustration, this scenario could not actually take place. 
Indictments must clearly specify the nature of the crime alleged. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
7(c)(l). 
12' See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 450 (1990) ("Th[e] rule does not 
require that each bit of evidence be unanimously credited or entirely discarded, but it 
does require unanimous agreement as to the nature of the defendant's violation, not 
simply the fact that a violation has occurred."). 
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Now change the defendant from Jane Smith to Beelzebub, Inc. 
Beelzebub faces trial for dumping hazardous waste into 
waterways in violation of the Clean Water Act.IZ2 The 
prosecution presents evidence that Mephisto, 
Beelzebub's senior vice president, dumped dry cleaning 
solvent into the Hudson River in 2004. The prosecution 
also argues that Sammael, Beelzebub's CFO, dumped 
biowaste into the Gulf of Mexico in 2003, also in 
violation of the Clean Water When the case goes 
to the jury, half of the jurors believe beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mephisto dumped into the Hudson. The other 
half is dubious about Mephisto but fervently believes 
that Sarnrnael dumped into the Gulf. Even though 
everyone on the jury believes that someone at Beelzebub 
did something illegal, they disagree about what actually 
happened. 
Here again, the jury should not convict for either crime. There is no 
agreement as to the act, actor, or intent. The jury does not agree on 
anything other than that at some time in the past, someone committed a 
crime of some sort and that that person worked at Beelzebub, Inc. That 
is a flimsy hook on which to hang a conviction. 
Yet, in United States v. Andersen, the judge allowed the jury to hang 
its verdict on this very hook. The jury did not agree on the actor 
(Temple, Duncan or Odum), or the action (directing subordinates to 
shred, sending an email suggesting shredding, or making a videotape 
encouraging employees to destroy evidence). It follows that the jury 
similarly lacked consensus on the presence of intent. If it could not 
agree on the nature of the crime or the person who committed it, the jury 
could not possibly have agreed on whether whoever committed the 
crime intended to do so. 
To convict amidst all this uncertainty would be manifestly wrong. A 
shared belief that someone did something illegal is not the same as a 
I2'See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.  $$ 13 19 (c)(l)-(2). 
lZ3 See id. 
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shared belief that a particular person committed a particular crime. Only 
the latter enables con~ ic t ion . '~~  
The government's case founders on other bases as well. In arguing 
that the jury could convict without knowing the identity of the corrupt 
persuader, prosecutors maintained that the identity of the guilty 
corporate agent was immaterial. The agent formed merely the method 
and means through which the entity, Andersen, committed the crime.'25 
The actual person or people who perpetrated the act were comparable to 
the weapon(s) used in a robbery; they were mere tools acting at the 
behest and under the control of the entity.'26 
This position directly contradicts the jury instructions, which 
required the jury to determine which agent at Andersen acted knowingly 
with corrupt intent to cause or persuade another employee to alter or 
destroy evidence.'27 Maintaining that the agent is fungible and that her 
identity is irrelevant to the entity's guilt negates the requirement that the 
jury decide who within the company acted as the corrupt persuader. On 
that basis alone, the government's argument should have failed. 
The government's position is also inconsistent as a matter of 
statutory exegesis and common sense. One cannot logically contend that 
agents of a corporation have no intent while simultaneously maintaining 
that those same agents were knowing corrupt persuaders. The two 
propositions are mutually exclusive. 
On the one hand, prosecutors contended that the guilty agent at 
Andersen knowingly and corruptly persuaded other employees to 
obstruct justice. On the other hand, prosecutors argued that agents at 
Andersen either have no mens rea of their own or that their mens rea is 
immaterial because they are mere pawns of the entity. According to the 
latter thesis, the guilty intent resides with the corporation and the identity 
of the agentlactor is therefore irrelevant. 
124 AS Justice Scalia observes in his concurrence in Schad, "We would not permit. . . an 
indictment charging that defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday, 
despite the "moral equivalence" of the two acts." 501 U.S. at 651 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
125 See Brief of Gov't, supra note 99, at 5. 
I z 6  See id. at 6. 
12' Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 59, at *212. 
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These two positions cannot coexist. Either the agent had the intent 
to corruptly persuade and did corruptly persuade or she did not. If the 
former, then under these facts, the jury must agree as to the agent's 
identity. If the latter, then, per the judge's instructions, the jury must 
acquit.'28 
Not only does the prosecution's argument strip the people making 
up the corporation of any will or intent of their own, it transposes that 
will or intention on to the corporate entity-a legal fiction created by the 
law as a matter of social ~0nvenience.l~~ To attribute intent to such a 
creation is to bring an incorporeal entity to life, a feat surpassing even 
that of Dr. Frankenstein. Frankenstein at least worked with a body that 
was once alive.I3O The government, on the other hand, wished to enliven 
something that never actually existed outside the printed page. 
''' See id.; see also Darling, supra note 4, at 165 1 ("Because knowing conduct and intent 
are an essential element [sic] of obstruction of justice, and because entity intent can be 
established only by reference to the intent of one or more agents, direct imputation of 
intent makes the identity of the corrupt persuader an essential element and disagreement 
on this element should be fatal to the government's case."). Darling goes on to argue 
that entities themselves can serve as corrupt persuaders. See id. at 1651-54. This 
position seems to impart overmuch agency to incorporeal entities. Even accepting the 
phenomenon of corporate intent as distinct from that of individual agents, the idea of 
distinct corporate actions remains problematic. 
A multiplicity of views exists as to the nature and origin of corporate "personhood," 
which attribute varying degrees of agency to the entity. The "Reality Theory," 
propounded by Otto von Gierke, argues that the law cannot create its subjects but rather 
can only recognize preexisting societal facts which meet its requirements. By this 
reasoning, recognizing corporate personhood involves the law simply acknowledging the 
existence of societal facts that create the corporate phenomenon and they meet the 
criteria for juristic personhood. 
Gierke's theory, though intriguing, begs the question of the nature of corporate 
personhood; it avers that since the law can't create persons, it couldn't have created 
corporate personhood. Furthermore, if we accept the common conception of a juristic 
person (that is to say, a person for purposes of the law) as something that is the subject of 
a right, legal personhood bears little relation to intentionality. The dispositive issue for 
purposes of agency lies in whether one "administers" those rights to which one is 
subject. This poses a question that is less legal than sociological. See FRENCH, supra 
note 56, at 38. The above discussion relies heavily on French's much fuller and highly 
lucid analysis of the issue. See id. at 34-38.; see also Friedman, supra note 94, at 846 
("While a corporation's possession o f .  . . rights suggests a separate identity . . . . that 
identity may represent nothing other than the sum of the rights the organization 
ossesses in aid of its business and enjoys at the sufferance of the legislature.") 
" See MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEM (Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley eds., London 
1831) 
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Furthermore, maintaining that the firm's agents were merely tools in 
the nefarious grip of a malevolent corporate entity expands the notion of 
corporate criminal liability to an unprecedented and unsustainable 
extreme. The bankruptcy of this reasoning becomes clear if we apply it 
to the crime of homicide. If a corporate employee kills someone on the 
orders of his employer, one can scarcely imagine a prosecutor arguing 
that the employee bears no responsibility, that she was merely an 
extension of the gun, and that the corporation pulled the trigger. Yet, the 
government made almost precisely this argument in the Andersen trial, 
explicitly comparing corrupt persuaders within the firm to guns.'31 
The roots of this novel legal approach lie within the collective 
knowledge doctrine, wherein corporate criminal intent is aggregated 
from a group of agents.'32 No one person at the entity intends to commit 
the entire criminal act. Instead, each actor intends to do a portion of the 
act and collectively, they intend to commit the crime even if they are not 
aware of each other.'33 Since corporate intent aggregates agents' 
intentions, the entity acquires an intention that does not exist at any 
individual level-a form of mental gestalt. However, even if the 
Andersen jury had been permitted to consider collective knowledge as a 
theory of guilt-which it was not-the prosecution's position barely 
resembles a typical collective knowledge premise. 
No one contended that the aggregated intents of Duncan, Odum, and 
Temple amounted to a "knowing" mens rea. Rather, the prosecution 
claimed that it did not matter what Duncan, Odum, or Temple might 
have intended because they were mere tools. By extension, it also did 
not matter that they committed entirely different acts. Subscribing to 
this logic strips all agency from agents. It relocates that agency in a 
131 See Brief of Gov't supra note 99, at 6. 
132 See FRENCH, supra note 56. 
133 See e.g., U.S. ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F3d 908, 
918 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding the collective knowledge doctrine "allow[s] a plaintiff to 
prove scienter by piecing together scraps of "innocent" knowledge held by various 
corporate officials, even if those officials never had contact with each other or knew 
what others were doing. . .") 
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liminal space wherein corporations gain intelligence, intention, and the 
power to act separate and apart from their agents.'34 
By the government's lights, Arthur Andersen, LLP - rather than any 
person at the fm - intended to (and did) corruptly persuade an 
employee to obstruct justice. As is now clear, this premise is incoherent 
for purposes of corporate criminal prosecution. However, there are 
circumstances where attributing a singular will to a collective is 
appropriate. The practice has roots in longstanding principles of 
international law, particularly the laws of war. 
The fact that prosecutors successfully injected this international 
vision of entity guilt into a domestic case is cause for alarm. 
International laws of war do not safeguard civil liberties in the ways that 
our Constitution requires. Adjudicating a peacetime criminal 
prosecution in this manner bodes ill for due process. A fuller discussion 
of the implications of this version of collective responsibility forms Part 
IV of this article. 
IV. ENTITY IDENTITY 
Disembodied legal fictions possessing criminal intent separate and 
apart from human agents is not as odd a concept as it might appear.13' 
L34 Though theorists of corporate responsibility vary in the amount of intention they 
ascribe to the corporate entity-French , for example, ascribes a great deal-I know of 
none who maintain that agents of the corporation lack any agency whatever. See 
FRENCH, supra note 56. That position is both unique to the Andersen prosecution and, I 
believe, logically insupportable. For detailed discussions of the various theories of 
corporate responsibility and their efficacy, see Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing 
Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation Toward Aggregation and 
the Search for Self-Identity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 641, 650-709 (2000); Annie 
Geraghty, Corporate Criminal Liability, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327, 328-336 (2002); 
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve? 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1477 (1996); see also Friedman,supra note 94, at 833-858. 
135 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 94, at 847 ("The modem corporation has an 
identifiable persona, to which we ascribe expressive conduct as a matter of course. [This 
means] a presence in the community quite apart from that of its owners, manager and 
employees."); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 75 M~NN. L. REV. 1095, 1123 (1991) (arguing that a corporation's 
ethos, the "abstract and intangible, character of a corporation [that is] separate from the 
substance of what it actually does," distinguishes it from its component members). 
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The concept of a collective entity having its own discrete identity enjoys 
wide acceptance in everyday speech and thought, both legal and 
colloquial. Consider: "The 5th Circuit upheld the ruling," "Ford 
discontinued the Thunderbird," or "the jury reached a verdict."136 
The Philadelphia Orchestra changes members frequently but its 
identity remains constant. Rock groups often continue to perform 
though few if any original members remain with the band.13' In each 
instance, membership in the collective shifts over time while the entity's 
identity stays static.I3* Collectives' ability to retain their identity amidst 
multiple personnel shifts amounts to an implicit cultural recognition of 
their independent id en ti tie^.'^^ 
B. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE BANALITY OF EVIL 
Acknowledging the ability of a collective to acquire a social 
identity distinct from the simple aggregation of its agents is a long way 
from advocating for criminal conviction on that basis. In the past, entity 
guilt of this sort has been confined to international law where nations, 
not just their citizens, can be held responsible for crimes.140 For 
''' Fletcher offers this intriguing example related by Bernard Williams: "The Fifth Army 
feinted toward the Rhine and then fell to looting and raping." The example contains 
instances of a group acting both collectively and individually. The army as a whole 
feinted toward the Rhine but individual soldiers committed the subsequent crimes. This 
is a useful illustration that collective identity can exist without eliminating individual 
ca acity for intent and action. FLETCHER, OMANTICS AT WAR, supra note 5 at 71. 
"'For example, the Rolling Stones changed guitarists twice and bassists once. Original 
guitarist Brian Jones died in 1969 and was replaced by Mick Taylor, who left the band in 
1974 and was replaced with Ron Wood. Bill Wyrnan, the bassist for almost three 
decades, left the band in 1991. Similarly, The Who endured the death of drummer Keith 
Moon in 1978 and the death of bassist John Entwhistle in 2002, but the band continues to 
record and tour. 
'38 Not every collective consists of fungible members. George Hanison famously 
declared that there will be no Beatles reunion "as long as John Lemon remains dead." 
See Nora Meany, They Can Work it Out, But Why?, THE SWON, (2000), 
http://www.thesimon.com/magazine/articles/old~issues/0097~they~work~out~but~why. 
html (last visited July 23,2005). Prior to his death, Lemon also opined on the collective 
phenomenon that was the Beatles, observing that, "I'm not the Beatles. I'm me. Paul 
isn't the Beatles. The Beatles are the Beatles. Separately, they are separate -I don't 
believe in Beatles. I just believe in me." Id. 
See FRENCH, supra note 56. 
14' See Steve Sheppard, Passion and Nation: War, Crime, and Guilt in the Individual and 
the Collective, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751, 755-56 (2003) (noting that, the Charter of 
the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice as well as 
subsequent international military tribunals and the International Criminal Court sought to 
"hold not only states accountable for war but also, effectively, the individuals whose 
orders and actions are the means of a state's prosecution of the war."). 
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example, some crimes like genocide are predicated on entity 
responsibility.'41 However, there are crucial differences in the 
circumstances of international criminal trials as opposed to the domestic 
prosecution of corporations. 
When nations and/or their citizens are tried by an international 
tribunal, it is because the social and legal system of the offending nation 
sanctioned behavior unacceptable to the international 
The citizens who committed the wrongfbl acts acted with the imprimatur 
of their legal system and might well have believed they were behaving 
appropriately. This leads to the infamous "banality of evil" phenomenon 
described by Hannah ~ r e n d t . ' ~ ~  
I .  The Eichmann Example 
Banality of evil refers to the experience of morally repugnant 
behavior becoming legally and culturally a c ~ e ~ t a b 1 e . l ~ ~  The reification 
of this phenomenon is Adolf Eichrnann, an unexceptional man who, 
following a mediocre scholastic career drifted into the SS and emerged 
as one of the chief administrators of the Final ~ o l u t i o n . ' ~ ~  His anti- 
Semitism was no more virulent than that of millions of his fellow 
citizens, yet his actions enabled the murder of millions of Jews. 
14' See FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR, supra note 5, at 69-70. 
14' The notion of justice is, of course, subject to interpretation and can vary from nation 
to nation. However, certain values are pan-national and have been codified in various 
international conventions and treaties. See Sheppard, supra note 138, at 755-56. John 
Rawls posits that the starting point for all laws inheres in certain foundational axioms 
upon which all people could theoretically agree. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
3 1 (1999). These reflect an "overlapping consensus" which people with a diversity of 
viewpoints can endorse because their values are incorporated within them. See JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL IBERALISM 9-1 1, 58-66, 65 (1993). This overlapping consensus 
arguably leads to the norms that form the basis for international law. See, e.g., MARTHA 
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME AND THE LAW 57 (2004) ("[Tlhe 
tyranny of the majority over minority opinion is a major danger in political life, and . . . 
one of the great strengths of the classical liberal tradition is its respect for spheres of 
freedom within which individuals choose the goals that they think most important."). 
Nussbaurn contrasts this view with that of Amitai Etzioni, whose cornmunitarian value 
system privileges homogeneity as the unifying factor within society. In this 
"monochrome society," citizens identify with what they have in common rather than 
what renders them distinct. Nussbaum further notes that neither classical liberals nor 
comrnunitarians would embrace a legal regime that chooses the norms society should 
value. Id. at 56-57. 
143 HANNAH ARENDT, ECHIMANN I  JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 
287 (Penguin Classics 1994) (1963). 
see id. at 135. 
'45 Id. at 20-2 1. 
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Eichmann viewed his behavior as law-abiding and therefore just. He felt 
"free of all guilt," secure in the knowledge that his superiors knew and 
approved of his actions.146 He even believed that his actions harmonized 
with the Kantian Categorical 1mperative.I4' 
Ascribing a duty of blind obedience to the Categorical Imperative 
completely misinterprets Kant's teachings.148 Kant perceived the 
human condition as a struggle to transcend sensual impulses and to act 
according to the dictates of pure reason. The laws of reason are 
independent of and need not bear any resemblance to the constructed 
laws of human ~ 0 c i e t y . l ~ ~  
Eichmann's misinterpretation is relevant here because his belief that 
the legality of his actions under German law relieved him of 
responsibility for his behavior bears directly on the notion of collective 
criminal intent. It is certainly possible to argue, as Eichmann did, that 
Id at 114. 
14' Arendt has little patience for Eichmam's reliance on Kantian reason, declaring it 
"outrageous" to presume Kant would have approved of blind obedience. See ARENDT, 
supra note 141, at 135. 
14' TO suggest that living in a nation of unjust laws absolves one of all moral 
responsibility is to claim that one is morally bound to obey unjust laws, an ethically 
bankrupt position. To borrow a phrase often attributed to Aquinas, "lex iniusta non est 
lex" ("an unjust law is not a law"). Though he never said precisely these words, the 
maxim does reflect Aquinas's thinking and, as a philosophical precept, has significant 
practical value. See generally, Norman Kretzmann, Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex: Laws on 
Trial in Aquinas' Court of Conscience, 33 AM. J. JURIS. 99 (1988). Karl Jaspers argues 
that we are accountable for the way we are governed, even if we live under a repressive 
regime and that we are accountable for our actions, regardless of the duress involved, if 
the act could be avoided. See FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR, supra note 5, at 78-79. 
John Rawls also provides some useful insight, observing that political legitimacy (from 
which would follow "legitimate law") requires a sincere belief that "the reasons we 
would offer for our political actions-were we to state them as government officials- 
are sufficient, and [that] we also reasonably think that other citizens might also 
reasonably accept those reasons." JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES WITH THE IDEA OF 
PUBLIC REASON REVISITED 137 (1 999). 
149 Kant declares that the concept of freedom is "the keystone of the whole architecture 
of the system of pure reason." IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 1 18 
(1949), Henry Allison notes that the concept of transcendental freedom-"an explicitly 
indeterminist . . . conception (requiring an independence of determination by all 
antecedent causes in the phenomenal world)" is at the heart of all of Kant's major 
writings. HENRY ALLISON, KANT'S THEORY OF FREEDOM 1 (1990). Rousseau also 
attributes the change from creature of impulse to one who obeys the laws of a civil 
society as a transition from enslavement to one's appetites to "moral liberty," which 
"makes man truly the master of himself." JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT: DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF EQUALITY, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL 
ECONOMY, 27 (Donald A. Cress trans.,) (1983). 
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not he but the German State intended to commit the atrocities for which 
he stood accused.150 The issue then becomes the degree of responsibility 
individuals must bear for reprobate conduct when their nation sanctions 
and even requires such behavior. 
2. Responsibility and First and Second Order Desires 
Harry Frankfurt offers a useful heuristic for analyzing free will 
through which we can examine the influence of one's surroundings on 
the ability to self-evaluate conduct. Frankfurt breaks the process of 
conscious action into first and second order desires. First-order desires 
include temptations to commit criminal acts-from shoplifting to serial 
rape. Second-order desires involve deciding whether to act on one's first 
order desires.151 Second-order desires are a prerequisite for 
"personhood in Frankfurt's schema.'52 Free will involves integrating 
one's behavior with one's second-order desires.153 
When the prevailing cultural milieu encourages behavior that 
deviates from commonly held norms, it inhibits second-order judgment. 
People cannot assess the suitability of their first-order desires because 
the better options are illegal andlor censored. Responsibility for any 
resulting criminal intent is therefore mitigated.154 Under these 
I5O As Michael Ignatieff observes, Hitler's Germany as well as Stalinist Russia were 
structured to eliminate the idea that government violence was problematic. "Far from 
being evils, Hitler's . . . acts of extermination were heralded as necessary to the creation 
of a utopia . . ." MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF 
TERROR 16 (2004). 
151 See Hany G,  Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in FREE 
WILL 322 (Gary Watson ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003). Frankfurt's construct resembles 
the principle of first and second order observation in cybernetics. First order observation 
involves observing something and second order observation involves observing one's 
observation. Since observation constitutes a form of participation, second order 
observation validates the Uncertainty Principle. One can never know the degree to 
which one's participation (through observation) affects an experiment. 
152 See id. at 323-24. ("No animal other than man . . . appears to have the capacity for 
reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires."). 
'53 See id. at 330. ("It is only because a person has volitions of the second order that he is 
capable both of enjoying and of lacking freedom of the will."). 
154 See FLETCHER, OMANTICS AT WAR, supra note 5, at 175-76 ("By . . . restricting the 
range of morally appealing options, the state deprives its citizens of .  . . the possibility of 
critical moral self-assessment. . . . It betrays its duty to create circumstances of moral 
action, and it bears part of the guilt for the crimes that result."). 
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conditions, the agency of the citizen-agents is compromised, though not 
eliminated.155 
Frankfurt's scheme offers a compelling argument for mitigating the 
guilt of actors who live in nations with a system of laws that encourage 
aberrant behavior. However, his framework does not work in a domestic 
legal context where, for example, a corporation stands accused of 
violating normatively acceptable national laws.Is6 As Fletcher observes, 
an immoral climate "require[s] teachers, religious leaders, politicians, 
policies of the state, and a network of supportive laws."157 Even then 
"the people constituting the society bear some of the 
3. The Nature of the "We-Intention " 
In the corporate context, a culture of lawlessness can exist within the 
entity, as was arguably the case with ~ n d e r s e n , ' ~ ~  but most of 
Frankfurt's other criteria, especially the policies of state and the network 
of supportive laws, are missing. In smaller collectives, which are subject 
to laws that are presumably just (rather than creators of laws that are 
See id. at 176 ("The crimes [committed by Eichrnann, among others] expressed not 
only their personal guilt but also the collective guilt of those who deprived the offenders 
of their second-order critical sensibilities."). Fletcher inexplicably includes Timothy 
McVeigh among those whose sensibilities were thus constrained, an assertion which 
does not seem to comport with the logic of his argument. 
The notion of normative acceptability is both fluid and problematic since norms vary 
from nation to nation and do not stay static over time. However, in this context I am 
referring to what Hugo Grotius called the rules of Reason, which limit what governments 
can legitimately do and how they may act toward one another. Rules based on Reason 
are natural rather than positive and binding even in the absence of any God. See BRIAN 
BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 71 ((1996). Robert George offers the 
useful phrase "moral ecology" to describe the normative system of the community. See 
ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 1 
(1993) (suggesting that laws should "preserve the moral ecology in which people make 
their morally self-constituting choices"). 
Fletcher, ROMANTICS AT WAR, supra note 5 ,  at 175. 
Is8 Id. Fletcher is discussing rationales for mitigating the guilt for living in a nation that 
encourages the banality of evil. I adapt his argument for a related purpose-to show 
that the above-described constraints on second-order decision-making as well as the 
national approbation of illicit acts do not exist in a domestic criminal context. 
See generally, TOFFLER supra note 8; SQUIRES ET AL., Supra note 7, at 11 5-1 18. Both 
books discuss the firm's metamorphosis from a paragon of virtue in the industry to a 
place where fraud and conflicts of interest were viewed as inevitable parts of doing 
business; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text. See also ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, 
PIGS AT THE TROUGH: HOW CORPORATE GREED AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION ARE 
UNDERMINING AMERICA 191-94 (2003) (describing how Andersen's firm culture led it on 
a "long road to ruin."). 
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unjust), second-order decision-making is not fatally compromised. 
Individuals must take responsibility for their actions and so too must the 
c~l lec t ive . '~~  The reason for the collective responsibility in this instance 
lies with what John Searle calls "we-intention." 
Searle believes that collective intentions are a product of self- 
conscious interdependence. If there exists a reciprocal understanding 
within a group as to what the group will do-be it playing a game or 
passing a law-then any ensuing actions are collective in nature and 
result from a collective wi11.161 That collective will-r "we- 
intentionyy-is distinct from the aggregated will of the group members 
because of the interdependence of the decisional process.'62 
The corporate "we-intention" differs markedly from its national 
counterpart. A firm's culture might encourage illegal behavior but the 
laws of the nation assumedly do not.163 There is ample opportunity for 
corporate agents to recognize that they are acting wronghlly. 
Consequently, their ability to knowingly intend their behavior is 
unaffected by their corporate affiliation. The distinction between a 
I6O Even those who advocate most strongly for collective responsibility as a morally 
distinct phenomenon acknowledge that collective actions result from individual 
initiatives. The end result of those aggregated initiatives, however, is an entity 
consciousness that is distinct from the sum of its parts. See, e.g. LARRY MAY, THE 
MORALITY OF GROUPS: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM AND 
CORPORATE RIGHTS 3 (1987) (arguing that "social groups should be given a moral status 
different from that of the discrete individual persons who compose them" but 
acknowledging that while the "relationships [within a social group] make for different 
acts, intentions, and interests than would exist outside the group, nonetheless they are 
relationships of individual persons.") (emphasis in original). See also FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 94, at 852 ("[Als a matter of law, corporations have the capacity to express 
judgments and attitudes that may be entirely unrelated to the personal views of their 
owners, managers and employees . . . . Consequently, the corporation qua corporation 
can suffer moral condemnation for its wrongdoing through criminal conviction and 
punishment. . ."). 
16' JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 23-26 (1995); see also 
Daniel R. Fishel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 19,323 (1996) 
(describing corporations as "webs of contractual relationships consisting of individuals 
who band together for their mutual economic benefit."). 
'62 See SEARLE, supra note 159, at 24-25 ("The crucial element in collective 
intentionality is a sense of doing . . . something together, and the individual intentionality 
that each person has is derived from the collective intentionality that they 
share.")(emphasis in original). 
'63 For evidence of this, one need look no further than 18 U.S.C. 5 1512 (2002), the 
statute under which Andersen was prosecuted. 
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national culture of evil and a conupt corporate culture is examined more 
fully be10w.I~~ 
4. Romanticism, Individualism & Associated Will 
Collective national guilt is predicated on Associated Will, wherein a 
nation becomes entified through the collective will of its populace. The 
nation emerges as more than just the aggregated wills of the citizenry; it 
is an actor itself, born of a national gestalt.'65 Professor Fletcher 
contends that though the phenomenon of Associated Will predates 
Romanticism, it is nevertheless a quintessentially Romantic construct. 
He contrasts it with the prevailing vision of liberal individualism that 
predominates within our legal system. 
Romantics view the individual as the fount of genius, the source of 
transformative emotions and the transcendence of the human condition. 
Each individual is unique and wondrous. Liberal individualists, by 
contrast, see equality as the governing principle of the human condition. 
"Liberals from Adam Smith to Immanuel Kant thought about individuals 
as created in much the same form. . . . [Tlhe crowning achievement of 
the eighteenth century Enlightenment was Thomas Jefferson's effort to 
bring all individuals under a single formula of moral equality. ,7166 
According to Fletcher, Romantics tend toward expansionist 
thinking; liberal individualists are reductionist.16' A liberal would view 
the Iraq War as a conflict between two nations with divergent interests 
while a Romantic might see it as a struggle for democracy in the Middle 
East. Similarly, a Romantic might view bread as the staff of life, rich 
with history and portent whereas a liberal would see a grain-based 
chemical phenomenon that is extraordinary for its marriage of 
ingredients and the chemical reaction that merged them. 168 
Romantics view collective identity as the transcendence of self and 
the apotheosis of the human ~0ndi t ion . I~~ They embrace movements as 
See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
165 See Fletcher, Storrs Lectures, supra note 5. 
166 FLETCHER, OMANTICS AT WAR, supra note 5, at 35-36; Fletcher, Storrs Lectures, 
supra note 5 at 1507-08. Thomas Jefferson's pronouncement in the Declaration of 
Independence that "all men are created equal" exemplifies the liberal vision moral 
equality. 
16' Fletcher, Storrs Lectures, supra note 5 ,  at 1508-09. 
168 See id. at 1508. 
169 FLETCHER, OMANTICS AT WAR, supra note 5, at 36 ("Romantics are drawn to 
movements, to crusades, and finally to armed conflicts."). 
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the expression of mass identity and are drawn to armed conflict as the 
means through which to ennoble h~manity.'~' Lord Byron's passionate 
adoption of the struggle for Greek independence, a cause that eventually 
cost him his life, epitomizes this Romantic worldview. 
Associated Will is the expression of this unified collective identity. 
It gains meaning through a shared culture and sense of purpose and has 
substantial functionality as a means of expressing entity responsibility in 
the international context. If national culture fosters and permits behavior 
that violates international norms, then the nation-as-collective may also 
be judged.17' 
Necessarily, entity prosecutions of this type are external - one nation 
is called to account by other nations in an international forum. Nations 
can neither prosecute themselves nor indict their citizens for obeying the 
country's own laws. Only in extra-ordinary legal times, as with the 
Eichmann case, could a citizen be called to account by an international 
court for crimes allegedly committed in his home country. 172 
C. NATIONAL VS. CORPORATE COLLECTIVE GUILT 
It makes sense to treat nations as actors on the international stage 
and to treat citizens acting according to the national will as 
representatives of that will. It likewise seems sensible at the domestic 
level to treat partnerships and corporations as entities that exist separate 
and apart from the aggregated wills of their agents.'73 This is the 
essence of corporate identity. 
Corporate identities do not change with a shifting membership. 
Their behavior must be must viewed in the context of what French calls 
the "Corporation's Internal Decision Structure," or "CID," which 
subordinates individual intentions within the corporate decisional 
I7O Id. at 36. 
See ARENDT, supra note 141. 
Eichmann's case was made all the more extraordinary for the circumstances of his 
arrest and trial. He was kidnapped by the Israeli Secret Service and handed over to the 
War Crimes Tribunal. The fact that a foreign national could be treated in this manner is 
itself testimony to the fact that prosecution takes precedence over typical civil liberties 
when dealing with war crimes. See id. at 240. See also United States Holocaust 
Museum Archive, http://www.ushmm.org-(last visited Sep. 19, 2005). 
'73 See supra note 8 1 and accompanying text. 
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matrix. '74 Nonetheless, the differences between nations and 
corporations and their respective milieus are stark and have important 
legal consequences. 
Nations enact laws that bind the populace. Assuming an autocratic 
government, citizens have little opportunity to amend or object to those 
laws. They must obey or face punishment. If adherence to the nation's 
laws violates international norms, then the juridical response to that 
violation must be international as well. 
Crimes committed under such a regime are endemic to the nation 
and exemplify the banality of evil. They arise from a culture of evil 
buttressed by a supportive legal system. Individual responsibility is 
mitigated by the nation's collective accountability for forcing its citizens 
to choose between obeying unjust laws and facing potentially 
catastrophic penalties.'75 Any prosecution must acknowledge the 
nation's complicity in the wrongful conduct. To do otherwise would 
ignore the fact that the defendant could not hlly exercise her second 
order decision-making faculties and that she faced punishment for 
disobedience to the nation's laws. 
Even if one accepts that in a culture of evil the nation bears some 
responsibility for its citizens' actions, citizens nevertheless retain a level 
of ac~oun tab i l i t~ . '~~  Free will survives even under adverse  condition^.'^^ 
One can, afier all, choose not to obey-accepting the consequences as 
preferable to obeying unjust laws. International law recognizes this 
premise. For example, the Nuremburg Court rejected Eichmann's 
'74 See FRENCH, supra note 56, at 39-41. French argues that the CID demonstrates that 
corporations must be viewed as intentional actors and that actions done in conformity 
with corporate policy fulfill the corporation's desires. See id. at 44. 
17' See Fletcher, Storrs Lectures, supra note 5, at 154 1-44. 
176 See Frankfurt, supra note 14, at 167-76. ("[Bleing coerced does not exclude being 
morally responsible. . . . [Cloercion affects the judgment of a person's moral 
responsibility only when the person acts as he does because he is coerced to do so - i.e., 
when the fact that he is coerced is what accounts for his action." Frankfurt's thesis is 
that there are many circumstances (and Eichrnann's may be among them) where a person 
is required to do something he would have done anyway. In those circumstances the 
coercion plays little or no part in the decision to act, regardless of the lack of alternatives. 
At such times, the actor is no less morally responsible than if the coercive circumstances 
did not exist. Frankfurt does not reject the possibility that coercion can mitigate moral 
responsibility- just that it need not always do so. 
'77 See id. 
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defense and convicted him.'78 Subsequent international treaties hold 
individuals accountable as we11.I7' 
The only instance where a nation potentially bears full responsibility 
for individual actions involves the behavior of soldiers. Soldiers who 
disobey orders face court martial, imprisonment, and/or death. As 
Foucault observes, soldiers are trained to become "political puppets, 
small scale models of power."lgO The methods of training, discipline and 
coercion make "possible the meticulous control of the operations of the 
body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed 
upon them a relation of docility-utility . . . . ~ ~ 1 8 1  On the battlefield, 
soldiers who refuse orders face penalties up to and including summary 
execution.Ig2 Unlike corporate actors or private citizens living under an 
illegal regime, soldiers' obedience is involuntary and any resulting 
actions are attributable to the nation that conscripted thern.Ig3 
Clearly, Andersen employees did not face such draconian 
consequences for failing to adhere to corporate standards. At worst, they 
faced dismissal. However, the culture at Andersen did play a large role 
in its downfall. The firm had a distinct identity that transcended the 
I7'See ARENDT, supra note 141, at 245,257. 
17' The international consensus on this issue has shifted over the last century. The 192 1 
Treaty of Leipzig allowed the existence of superior orders to negate the guilt of the 
subordinate who followed them. Thus, for example, the crew of U-Boat that sank a 
hospital ship during WWI was acquitted of wrongdoing because they were following 
their captain's orders. The tribunals of the 1940s rejected this defense and convicted the 
crew of a WWII era U-Boat that machine-gunned the survivors of a steamer it had 
torpedoed to prevent them from revealing the whereabouts of the submarine. The 1998 
Rome Treaty governing the new International Criminal Court, which rejects the notion 
that orders from a superior form a defense to guilt but allows that ignorance of the 
illegality of the conduit can mitigate punishment. See Sheppard, supra note 138, at 763- 
64 and n.53-54; United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art. 33, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 18319 
(1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 
2005) (stating same). 
Ig0 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 136 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1975). 
Is' Id. at 137. 
I g 2  See PAUL F. BOLLER, JR., PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 45 (1984). (detailing the 
execution of six militiamen for desertion, with General Andrew Jackson's approval, 
during the Creek War in 18 13). 
Ig3 According to Rousseau, "[wlar is not . . . a relationship between one man and 
another, but a relationship between one state and another." ROUSSEAU, supra note 147, at 
21. Soldiers at war ceask to function as citizens of the society and become its defenders. 
They act not as individuals but as servants of the state. Id. 
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aggregate of its individual employees and created a milieu with its own 
norms and guidelines. 
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of corporate identity remains distinct 
from Associated Will. A corporation's rules of employment must be 
subordinate to and in compliance with the laws of the nation. Corporate 
individuality therefore exists only within normative parameters 
established by the incorporating nation. Nations, as the societal law- 
making body, do not have any such constraints. Consequently, national 
identity1Associated Will is a discreet phenomenon from that of a 
corporation. Understanding how the two concepts differ is crucial to 
comprehending the nature of the government's error in the Andersen 
trial, as well as the dangers that the error poses going forward. 
Andersen had a distinct corporate identity. Its identity grew out of 
its founder's personality and evolved into something he scarcely would 
have recognized. The firm's culture exercised powerful influence over 
its employees (hence the term, "Androids") and created an atmosphere 
that tolerated and even seemed to encourage illegal behavior. 
In this sense, the culture at Andersen resembled Associated ~ i 1 1 . l ' ~  
Its identity, though distinct from the individuals that made up the 
collective, was inseparable from their aggregated will. Nevertheless, 
there are important reasons why the Andersen culture differs from 
Associated Will. Those differences become especially significant when 
assessing entity guilt in domestic criminal prosecutions. 
I .  Corporations Do Not Make Law 
Corporations are products of the legal system of the nation where 
they reside.'" They exist because of the society's laws and are likewise 
bound by them.lS6 Unlike nations, corporations cannot legislate and 
have no legal authority over their agents. When an employee pledges 
allegiance to a corporate employer, it is because the two entities (the 
individual and the corporation) share a common goal. The corporation's 
success theoretically redounds to the employee's benefit. If an 
employee did not share this view she presumably would seek other 
L84 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
'" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 365 (8th ed. 2004). 
ls6 Id.  at 341 (citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 17 U.S. 518, 636 
(18 19) (Marshall, J.)). 
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employment. Enlisting in the corporation and subordinating individual 
goals for the good of the corporation is voluntary. Merging individual 
will with that of the corporate entity exemplifies self-conscious 
interdependence rather than a constraint on free will. 
Consequently, when an agent acts anti-socially but in compliance 
with corporate desires, both agent and corporation are responsible. The 
agent's culpability is self-evident; she acted with intention. Even as she 
subsumed her individual goals to those of the collective, she retained 
free will and agency and chose to act as she did. 
Corporate responsibility stems from the fact that the agent's actions 
aimed to fulfill corporate desires.''' When an act undertaken by an 
agent or agents of the corporation instantiate or implement a corporate 
policy, then it follows that the act was done for corporate reasons. One 
could then extrapolate that the act fulfilled a corporate desire."* It 
follows that the corporation intended the act.ls9 
However, the best interests of the corporation remain discreet from 
the best interests of the agent who acted on the corporation's behalf. 
That their respective interests align (in the sense that if the corporation 
does well, the employee also benefits) does not make them identical. 
Instead, the employee has subordinated her personal desires to the 
collective desire of the corporation. Because corporate desires provided 
the impetus for her action, the corporation shares responsibility for its 
consequences. 
2. Corporations Are Subject to the Law 
Corporate desire can sometimes appear more culpable than the 
action itself. In 1980, Ford Motor Company was tried in Indiana for 
reckless homicide stemming from a fatal car crash.Ig0 Prosecutors 
claimed that the automaker had failed to warn consumers that the 
placement of the Ford Pinto's fuel tank behind the rear axle posed a 
severe fire hazard in the event of a rear end collision. The case 
foundered when a document from the civil trial was ruled inadmissible. 
The document allegedly showed that the company calculated the costs of 
retrofitting the vehicle ($137 million) outweighed the benefits in human 
18' I use the term "corporate desire" in the same manner that French does - to denote a 
product of the CID. FRENCH, supra note 56, at 44. 
See id. 
Is9 See id. at 52. 
I9O State v. Ford Motor Co., 47 U.S.L.W. 25 14 (Ind. Super. 1979). 
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lives saved (calculated at $49.5 million with an average life valued at 
$200,000).191 
Ultimately, Ford was acquitted largely because the prosecution 
could not introduce a document crucial to demonstrating the company's 
criminal intent. Similarly, Andersen's conviction was overturned 
because the jury could not properly assess the firm's criminal intent. 
In the end, neither Andersen nor Ford was found criminally liable, 
with each case turning on the prosecution's inability to demonstrate 
intent. That neither prosecution succeeded is indicative more of how 
difficult it is to prove collective intent than that such intent does not 
exist. It does not necessarily point to any deficiency with the 
methodology for proving corporate guilt. 
While corporations can be held accountable for their agents' actions, 
entity responsibility does not diminish the agency of individual agents. 
Guilt at the corporate level is not a zero-sum equation. This contrasts 
with the national phenomenon wherein anti-social behavior is legal 
andlor required, creating a culture of evil wherein people lack sufficient 
data to inform their behavior. Under such circumstances, individual 
responsibility is mitigated commensurate with the responsibility of the 
nation.'92 
E. ENTITY GUILT - SECOND VS. FIRST ORDER DECISION MAKING 
We can differentiate between corporate collective responsibility and 
Associated Will by applying Frankfurt's first and second order decision- 
making m0de1.l~~ At the national level, a culture of evil impedes (but 
does not abrogate) citizens' ability to engage in second-order decision- 
making which involves evaluating temptations that arise from first-order 
19' The prosecution was unsuccessful, likely due in large part to the State's inability to 
introduce the offending document. Ford retains the dubious distinction of being the first 
and only corporation in American history to face criminal prosecution for homicide. 
Revisiting the case a decade later, Gary Schwartz argues that the document is not nearly 
as damning as is widely believed. In his view, a closer analysis of  both the documentary 
evidence and the context in which it was prepared casts at least some doubt on the idea 
that the company recklessly disregarded the potential human costs that could result from 
the car's design. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGER~ 
L. REV. 1013, 1016-23 (1991). 
19' In this way, according to Sheppard, "the individual and the nation both remain 
morally responsible, and the values of the Enlightenment are not altogether extinguished 
by application of the Romantic ethic." Sheppard, supra note 138 at 764. 
193 See Frankfurt, supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
Heinonline - -  13 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 229 2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 6  
Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 13:2 
desires. Without the normative compass that a just legal system 
provides, citizens lack an important means through which to assess 
temptation and determine a proper course of action. Even if they 
understand that complying with the law would be normatively wrong, 
they nevertheless face criminal penalties for failing to do so. 
By contrast, corporate corruption leads to increased Jirst-order 
temptations. When a corporation pressures an employee to behave 
illicitly, the increased first-order temptation complicates the second- 
order evaluation process. However, the employee's world is not 
confined to her corporate affiliation. She remains bound by society's 
laws-the same laws binding the corporation. When considering 
whether to act on her first-order desires, she can and should evaluate 
their conformity with prevailing law. If she does, she will realize that 
the contemplated behavior is illegal and that she should refrain. 
The crucial difference between corporate culture and Associated 
Will, then, is that a corporation cannot create a culture of evil. 
Corporations are subject to the laws of the incorporating nation. So long 
as the nation's laws do not condone illegal behavior, there exists no 
systemic illegality. Therefore, though corporate employees may face 
increased first-order temptations, they have no excuse for not engaging 
in the second-order evaluation that ought to inhibit acting on first order 
desires. If they act anyway, they must bear responsibility for doing so. 
The corporation must likewise accept responsibility for its desires 
having created the first-order temptation. 
Andersen was a corporate entity functioning within a society, rather 
than a society hct ioning within an international community. Andersen 
employees therefore retained their second order faculties. Though a 
discrete entity under the law, the firm did not and could not function 
separately from its agents. lg4  
When facing criminal trial, Andersen was entitled to the same legal 
protections enjoyed by other legal "persons," including due process and 
jury unanimity. The issue posed in Note # 9 dealt with the nature of 
corporate criminality and entity due process. Faced with jury skepticism 
as to the responsible Andersen agent, the court retooled corporate 
'" Brief of Anderson, supra note 96, at 1-2. 
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criminal law to enable conviction without consensus.'95~s a result of the 
judge's ruling, the jury was permitted to consider convicting without 
having agreed on the crime, much less the responsible agent. Even if 
each member of the jury had believed that a different person did a 
different thing, they still could have convicted Andersen of obstruction 
of justice. 
The judge apparently accepted the prosecution's argument that 
Andersen's entity responsibility should be expanded and its agents' 
agency contracted. The ruling effectively treated Andersen as a rogue 
nation facing an international tribunal rather than as a corporate citizen 
in a United States court. As such, it violated Andersen's due process 
rights and set a disturbing precedent for future trials. 
CONCLUSION & POSTCRIPT 
1) In the Andersen trial, the collective guilt rationale advanced by 
the prosecution and allowed by the judge in response to Jury Note # 9 
was constitutionally and logically wrong. Jury unanimity is required for 
conviction. This means that the jury must agree on the intent and the 
act. Note # 9 showed that the jury had not agreed on either one. 
2) The trial judge made a serious error when she permitted the jury 
to deliberate with the understanding that it did not need to reach 
consensus regarding the nature of the crime. Attributing responsibility 
for an agent's actions to a domestic corporate entity is unworkable, 
unnecessary, and violates due process. 
3) Andersen's culture was dysfunctional and led to myriad instances 
of its ill-serving the public. Andersen the entity must bear some 
responsibility for its wrongdoing. Nonetheless, the wrongful acts 
committed by Andersen were carried out by agents acting consciously 
and manifesting their own intent. The firm's complicity neither negates 
nor replaces agent responsibility. 
4) The prosecution's response to the jury's query inappropriately 
injected a component of international entity prosecutions into a domestic 
criminal trial. Only nations can create societies and systems of laws that 
sanction criminal behavior. Under such systems, free will is critically 
compromised. 
195 Landsman, supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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It is worth considering why, when faced with such formidable legal 
barriers, Andersen prosecutors employed the strategy they did as well as 
why the judge embraced it. They effectively propounded a theory of 
guilt based on Associated Will. Does this mean that the prosecutors at 
the Department of Justice and a sitting federal judge have turned into 
Romantics? In a sense, perhaps they have - not personally, but rather 
as representatives of a government that favors large-scale movements, 
appeals to patriotism, and crusades against e ~ i 1 . l ~ ~  
The court's ruling epitomizes a willingness to sacrifice basic 
liberties for the perceived greater good of public safety. This mindset 
normally occurs during national emergencies, especially during wartime. 
However, the nation is not at war in the traditional sense. Instead, it has 
declared war on an array of incorporeal forms and notions, including 
terrorism, drugs, crime, illiteracy, and poverty. 197 
The widespread use of the rhetoric of war-a tendency that has 
intensified in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks4reates an 
atmosphere wherein procedural safeguards become de-emphasized in the 
name of public safety. This policy is self-undermining and dangerous, 
particularly since the nation is no more at war with crime than with any 
other abstra~ti0n.I~~ 
Ig6 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
19' That is not to say that the United States has been reluctant to wage war on defined 
entities such as nations. In the last quarter-century alone, the US has been involved in 
military actions in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
Nonetheless, the "declaration of war" as a method of formalizing hostilities between 
nations appears to have lost currency in recent years. As discussed infia, the declaration 
of war once served as a formal signal that transformed the status of a country, both 
within and without, from the rules of peace to the rules of war. See Fletcher, ROMANTICS 
AT WAR supra note 5, at 46-48. Though global conflicts are no less frequent today, one 
sees fewer and fewer declarations of war between nations. For example, the United 
States has not formally declared war on any nation since 1941. Ironically though, on the 
domestic front, the US declares war so often that the term has lost much of its meaning. 
Between the wars on poverty, drugs, illiteracy, crime and terrorism, among others, the 
nation is either in a state of constant belligerence or delusion. 
Ig8 See Leonard Cassuto, The Power of Words, The Chron. Rev., Sept. 28,2001, at B13. 
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The American obsession with war199 has assumed enormous political 
and legal importance in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the conjoined "wars" on crime and 
terror.200 The nation has entified and made enemies of sociological 
phenomena.201 
This rhetoric of war has wrought considerable changes on the 
American legal landscape, including increased obstacles to death penalty 
appeals202 "three strikes and you're out" laws203 and the use of the 
military to interdict and participate in the ancillary "War on D ~ U ~ S . " * ~ ~  
199 See generally, ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: HOW 
AMERICANS ARE SEDUCED BY WAR (2005). As Tony Judt observes in his review essay of 
Bacevich's book, the United States spends more on defense than the entire rest of the 
world combined, it is the only country where soldiers are omnipresent in political photo 
ops, movies and television, and civilians queue up to buy expensive faux military 
vehicles. Tony Judt, The New World Order, 52 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 12, 16 (2005) 
(reviewing ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: HOW AMERICANS 
ARE SEDUCED BY WAR (2005)). 
There is considerable irony in the fact that for the past sixty years-years during 
which the nation has engaged in at least seven military conflicts on foreign soil-the 
only wars the United States has actually declared have been on domestic social ills. 
201 The propensity to declare war against ideas and social ills is over half a century old 
and arguably started with the "Cold War" against the spread of communism. In his 
farewell address to the nation in 1953, President Truman, speaking of the Cold War, said 
"I have had hardly a day in office that has not been dominated by this all-embracing 
struggle-this conflict between those who love freedom and those who would lead the 
world back into slavery and darkness." The President's Farewell Address to the 
American People, 1952-1953, in Bruce Ackerman, Response: This is Not a War, 113 
YALE L.J. 187 1, 1872 at n.2 (2004). Ackerman also cites presidential speeches from the 
1960s (declaring the "unconditional war on poverty") and the 1980s (declaring war on 
drugs and organized crime, respectively). Id. 
None of the "enemies" in these "wars" show any sign of conceding. David Frum wryly 
observed that the late Daniel Patrick Moynihan "was an officer in the War on Poverty, 
the War on Drugs, the War on Crime [and] the War on Cancer . . . a series of debacles 
beside which the military history of Italy begins to look impressive." David Frum, The 
Tory From New York, AM. SPECTATOR, Nov. 1996, at 74. 
202 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104- 
132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
203 See, e.g.,18 U.S.C. $ 355(9)(c) (1995); Ark. Code Ann. $ 5-4-501(d)(l) (2005); Cal. 
Penal Code $ 999e (Deering 2005). 
204 Following Randolph Bourne, who observed that war is the health of the state (he was 
speaking of World War I), David Kopel and Paul M. Blackman observe that "[tlhe drug 
war has been the health of the military state, and may in the long run be the death of the 
Constitution." David Kopel & Paul M. Blackman, Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers? The 
Waco Disaster and the Militarization of American Law Enforcement, 30 AKRON L. REV. 
619,656 (1997). 
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Following September 11, a new front was opened and the war(s) 
inten~ified.~'~ 
War now infuses all aspects of American society, both international 
and domestic. Internationally, the "Global War on Terror" informs 
every aspect of American foreign policy--even though it is a war 
against no known enemy and has no foreseeable end. It follows that if 
the United States continues on its present course, it will remain on a war 
footing with most of the world indefinitely. 
Not only do these "concept wars" involve no defined enemy, they 
also do not involve the laws of war. The body of rules that govern during 
wartime is known as "jus in bellow and differs markedly from the laws 
that govern a democracy during peacetime.206 The state of war involves 
its own normative structure and rules.207 As Fletcher observes, the 
peacetime legal system where citizens enjoy many rights against the 
state and few reciprocal duties is replaced with a war regime where 
citizens, like soldiers, have many duties and few rights.208 
The United States currently seeks to have it both ways. It has 
assumed a permanent war footing but does not treat the purported enemy 
as a wartime foe. For example, captured prisoners in Guantanamo Bay 
and elsewhere are "unlawful combatants" lacking the rights afforded 
'OS The rhetoric of a "War on Terror" is not new. It dates at least as far back as 1984, 
when President Reagan described the United States' counter-terrorism policy as a "war 
against terrorism." See Sheppard, supra note 138 at 753 n.lO. However, the 
government response to the September 11 attacks transformed the endeavor into a full 
scale military operation. 
'06 See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS, 21 (3rd ed. Basic Books 2000) 
(1977); FLETCHER, OMANTICS AT WAR, supra note 5 at 47. 
'07 For example, the Enemy Alien Act, 50 U.S.C $ 5  21-24 (2002) gives the government 
special powers over aliens during wartime In Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948), 
the Court upheld the Act and in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), the Court 
held that enemy aliens captured on the field of battle had no right to challenge their 
subjection to military trial. However, as David Cole notes, "the 'enemy alien' rule 
applies only in a time of declared war and only to citizens of the country with which we 
are at war." DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 12 (2003) (emphasis in original). Recent 
jurisprudence has made clear that the scope of presidential authority has been greatly 
expanded through Congress's enactment of the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
Joint Resolution (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001). See also infra 
note 208. 
'08 FLETCHER, OMANTICS AT WAR, supra note 5 at 47. 
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under international law.209 Yet, they were captured as part of a military 
operation and detained because they pose a threat to national security. 
Domestically, the impact has been equally drastic, including 
indefinite detention of American citizens, laws permitting increased 
domestic surveillance provisions,20s and other initiatives designed to 
safeguard public safety at the expense of personal freedoms. The upshot 
is that though the United States is currently engaged in military action in 
two foreign countries, it does not adhere to the accepted jus in bello. 
Yet, it shows no similar compunction about invoking the exigencies of 
wartime to justify suspending or lessening domestic civil liberties. 
Amidst this hodgepodge of war and peace, it should not surprise that 
a tactic of war crime prosecutions has found its way into a domestic 
criminal trial. In a sense, the illogic of the Andersen prosecution 
amounts to a tacit indictment of the "wars" on crime and terror. The 
American legal system is a delicate equipoise of rights and obligations. 
Importing rhetoric that deprivileges rights threatens the system's core 
function. 
War is quintessentially a political act whose goal is to effectuate 
systemic political change through force of arms. It presupposes a foe 
dedicated to opposing that change. Crime is both a creation of law and 
combated by the forces of law. Those who would make war on crime do 
not wish fundamental change but rather to strengthen the status quo. 
Criminals similarly seek only to improve their situation within the social 
system; they do not seek wholesale systemic change. A war on crime is 
therefore incoherent by definition. 
If recourse to the laws of society is possible, then the conflict 
involves law enforcement rather than war.209 If there is no war, then 
there is no entity1Associated Will whose allegiance to a foreign set of 
209 See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d. 386, 390-91 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding the President 
possesses authority pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force to detain an 
enemy combatant). See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 5 19 (2004) ("There is no 
bar to this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant."). 
208 See, e.g., Pub. L. No 107-56, 5 ,  215 (2001) (enabling the FBI to demand a patron's 
borrowing records at the library under the Patriot Act). 
209 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and 
International Law, Continued, 84 AM.J. I N T ' L  L. 444, 491 (1990) ("Real war permits- 
sometimes requires-relaxation of restraints on governmental action; law 
enforcement-investigation, arrest, trial, sentence, punishment-is law, not war, and 
therefore a reflection of our values--our peacetime, abiding values."). 
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laws and norms makes it the enemy. The rules of engagement that 
govern during an armed conflict are therefore neither necessary nor 
relevant. 210 
A war on "terror" has marginally more coherence because terrorism 
constitutes an attack on politics itself. It aims at effectuating systemic 
change through random violence. However, though society must defend 
itself against terrorists, it remains impossible to make war on terror, an 
amorphous concept that spans national and political allegiances. 
Terrorism, like crime, lacks a unifying consciousness against which to 
focus hostilities. Without agents who self-identify, declare allegiance to 
a means or ideal, and attempt to carry out actions aimed at 
accomplishing those ideals, terrorism remains an abstraction. 
Terrorists, once identified, constitute an enemy, but this only begins 
a complex analysis. What if the terrorist acts alone, or with a few 
accomplices? Is the nation at war with a couple of people? How many 
terrorists must band together before they become a collective entity 
against whom a nation can wage war? The answers to such questions 
are far from obvious.211 
Agents carrying out terrorist actions against the state are belligerents 
of a type. However, they occupy a limbic space between domestic and 
war criminals. The mechanics of their prosecution, including a 
determination of the types of rights to which they are entitled, presents 
210 General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently complained 
that the phrase "war on terror" was counterproductive because it presupposed a military 
solution. Shortly thereafter, on Aug. 3, 2005, President Bush emphatically declared that 
it was a "war," using the word thirteen times in a forty-seven minute speech that was 
primarily on domestic initiatives. Richard W. Stevenson, President Makes It Clear: 
Phrase is 'War on Terror, ' N .  Y .  TIMES, Aug. 4,2005, at A12; Dan Froomkin, War: The 
Metaphor, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
dynlcontentlblog/2005/08/04/BL2005080400971 .html (last visited Aug. 8, 2005) 
(chronicling the Administration's struggle with the phrase "war on terror" coupled with 
its unwillingness to bear the political cost of abandoning the rhetoric). 
21 l One commentator suggests viewing the war on terror as a "condition" rather than a 
war. A condition refers to a more or less permanent state of affairs during which citizens 
should make every effort to lead a normal life. This perspective fits with the Bush 
Administration's recommendations that people get on with their lives and refuse to live 
in a constant state of fear. If the struggle to suppress terrorism is, in fact, a condition to 
which we should become accustomed, then "war-as-condition is a normal state of affairs, 
not an emergency in which extraordinary measures might be appropriate. And the 
normal constitutional rules ought to apply in normal conditions." Mark Tushnet, 
Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties In Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 
273,280 (2003). 
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an ongoing challenge. But, similar to the Andersen case, it is impossible 
to prosecute terrorism, much less wage war upon it, without identifying 
the specific individuals whose will and actions give it shape.212 
The conclusions of this article are twofold. First, the Andersen 
prosecution and the trial judge erred when they respectively the idea that 
the jury could treat the firm as an entity capable of its own intent, 
separate and apart from the intentions and actions of its agents. One can 
prosecute nations or individuals for national crimes in times where 
typical civil liberties and constitutional protections are suspended. That 
was not, nor should it have been, the case here. 
Second, the Andersen trial occurred during a time of unprecedented 
erosion of civil liberties and the placement of the country on a 
permanent war footing. The events of the trial are serious in their own 
right as an issue of due process. But they also form part of a larger, far 
more serious issue. 
James Madison wrote in 1795 that "no nation can preserve its 
freedom in the midst of continual warfare."213 Madison's admonition 
has little traction today. In 2004, President Bush declared that: "[tlhis 
country must go on the offensive and stay on the offensive."214 The 
impacts of this ongoing state of war now permeate the legal 
2'2 Bruce Ackerman offers the sobering observation that making war on amorphous ideas 
will inevitably lead to increased wars on sovereign states: "[Olnce the public is 
convinced that a larger 'war on terrorism' is going on, these separate wars can be 
re ackaged as mere 'battles."' Ackerman, supra note 199, at 1876. 
"'JAMES MADISON, POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS, LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON, VOL. IV 49 1 (1 795). 
214 Judt, supra note 197. The idea of a constant offensive was not new to the Bush 
Administration. As far back as 1987, the Congressional Office of Technology 
Assessment had this to say about the "war on Drugs": "If the war on drugs is to be 
successful, the character of that war will need to be broadly understood. Perhaps the 
most important thing to recognize is that there will be no clean, clear victory. The enemy 
will not surrender, fold his tent and return home." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
CONGRESSIONAL BOARD, NTIS ORDER #PB87-184 172, THE BORDER WAR ON DRUGS 17 
(March, 1987), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu~ota~Ota~3DATNl987/8702.PDF. 
2'5 In his Farewell Address, George Washington reminded the nation that "overgrown 
military establishments are . . . particularly hostile to republican liberty." See Greg 
Guma, Addicted to War: An Insider Examines the Seductive Myths of Militarism, 
COMMON DREAMS NEWS CENTER, June 24, 2005, 
http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0624-26 (last visited Aug. 12,2005). 
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The resulting danger to liberty is real and worsening. The Allies in 
World War I aspired to "make the world safe for democracy." The 
current and ongoing state of war is having the opposite effect; it is 
making democracy unsafe. 
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